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[From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 10, 1788.]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XXXV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern, that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field, with mutual intelligence and concert — an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army : and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions, which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the National authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the Convention proposes to empower the Union “to provide
“for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,
“and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, *reserving
“to the States respectively the appointment of the officers,
“and the authority of training the militia according to
“the discipline prescribed by Congress.”*

Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the Convention, there is none

that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body, which is constituted the guardian of the National security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the Fæderal Government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the *POSSE COMITATUS*, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the Fæderal Government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the *POSSE COMITATUS*. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that

a right to pass all laws *necessary and proper* to execute its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident, that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the Fæderal Government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the motives, which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and judgment?

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the Fæderal Government. It is observed, that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the National Government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the Fæderal Legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the following discourse:—

“The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements, is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the People, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the present numbers of the People, would not fall far short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the People at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.

“But though the scheme of disciplining the whole Nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance, that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the Government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the

“plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of
“well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever
“the defence of the State shall require it. This will
“not only lessen the call for military establishments,
“but if circumstances should at any time oblige the
“Government to form an army of any magnitude,
“that army can never be formidable to the liberties of
“the People, while there is a large body of citizens, lit-
“tle, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use
“of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights,
“and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to
“me the only substitute that can be devised for a stand-
“ing army, and the best possible security against it, if
“it should exist.”

Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should I reason on the same subject; deducing arguments of safety from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the National Legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.

There is something so far fetched, and so extravagant, in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss, whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice, to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, in the name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen; and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its services when necessary,

while the particular States are to have the *sole and exclusive appointment of the officers*? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia, upon any conceivable establishment under the Fœderal Government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt, that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.

In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which, instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes —

“Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire;”

discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming everything it touches into a monster.

A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlân. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in militia-men instead of Louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment, there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the People; at another moment, the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes, five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance, to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate, imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the People of America for infallible truths?

If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed People? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened Nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning People? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of chagrined incendiaries, or distempered enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the National rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.

In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper, that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had

superadded the incitements of self-preservation, to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.

I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the Government; and have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy. The mass of Judiciary power, however, might have claimed an investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries, upon which we shall next enter.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the Daily Advertiser, Friday, January 11, 1788.*]

THE FœDERALIST. No. XXXVI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

IN reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that they cannot be supplied by a Government of less energy than that before the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is, to determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be completed without taking a

more critical and thorough survey of the work of the Convention; without examining it on all its sides; comparing it in all its parts; and calculating its probable effects.

That this remaining task may be executed under impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this place be indulged, which candor previously suggests.

It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require an unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to attend to this consideration, it could not appear surprising, that the act of the Convention, which recommends so many important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In some, it has been too evident from their own publications, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution, not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a predetermination to condemn; as the language held by others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias, which must render their opinions also of little moment in the question. In placing, however, these different characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in the purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of the latter description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be peculiarly critical, and to require indispensably, that some-

thing should be done for our relief, the predetermined patron of what has been actually done may have taken his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well as from considerations of a sinister nature. The predetermined adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed by no venial motive whatever. The intentions of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright, and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these papers are not addressed to persons falling under either of these characters. They solicit the attention of those only, who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it.

Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the Plan submitted by the Convention, not only without a disposition to find or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to which the Convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will keep in mind, that they themselves also are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.

With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these inducements to candor, many allowances ought to be made, for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to the Convention.

The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been shown in the course of these papers, that the existing Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently change this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown, that the other Confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can there-

fore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most that the Convention could do in such a situation, was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own; and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future experience may unfold them.

Among the difficulties encountered by the Convention, a very important one must have lain, in combining the requisite stability and energy in Government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty, and to the republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in Government is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good Government. Stability in Government is essential to National character, and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the People, which are among the chief blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself, than it is odious to the People; and it may be pronounced with assurance, that the People of this country, enlightened as they are, with regard to the nature, and interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good Government, will never be satisfied, till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties, which characterize the State administrations. On comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them

together in their due proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the People, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the People, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period, the trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires, that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures, from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in Government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand.

How far the Convention may have succeeded in this part of their work, will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part.

Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the General, and that of the State Governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects, extensive and complicated in their nature. The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated, by such delicate shades and minute gradations, that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the great kingdoms of nature, and, still more, between the various provinces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford another illustration of the same important truth.

The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized matter, or which marks the termination of the former, and the commencement of the animal empire. A still greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters, by which the objects in each of these great departments of nature have been arranged and assorted.

When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises as well from the object itself, as from the organ by which it is contemplated; we must perceive the necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science of Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different Legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.

The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of the most enlightened legislators and jurists, have been equally unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws, and different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the common law, and the statute law, the maritime law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more industriously pursued than in

any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of her several Courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of admiralty, &c., is not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity therefore requires, not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriated to them. But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen, that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.

Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions: indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must produce a certain

degree of obscurity. The Convention, in delineating the boundary between the Fæderal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced the full effect of them all.

To the difficulties already mentioned, may be added the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States. We cannot err, in supposing that the former would contend for a participation in the Government, fully proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose, that neither side would entirely yield to the other, and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It is extremely probable, also, that after the ratio of representation had been adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh struggle between the same parties, to give such a turn to the organization of the Government, and to the distribution of its powers, as would increase the importance of the branches, in forming which they had respectively obtained the greatest share of influence. There are features in the Constitution which warrant each of these suppositions; and as far as either of them is well founded, it shows that the Convention must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety, to the force of extraneous considerations.

Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which would marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various points. Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local position and policy, must have created additional difficulties. As every State may be divided into different districts, and its citizens into different classes, which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies; so the different parts of the United States are distinguished from each other, by a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And although this variety of inter-

ests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper, may have a salutary influence on the administration of the Government when formed; yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been experienced in the task of forming it.

Would it be wonderful, if, under the pressure of all these difficulties, the Convention should have been forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry, which an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet, or in his imagination? The real wonder is, that so many difficulties should have been surmounted; and surmounted, with an unanimity almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance, without partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection, not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand, which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the Revolution.

We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands, for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their Constitution. The history of almost all the great councils and consultations held among mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and disappointments; and may be classed among the most dark and degraded pictures, which display the infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by their lustre to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect, to which they are contrasted. In revolving the causes from which these ex-

ceptions result, and applying them to the particular instance before us, we are necessarily led to two important conclusions. The first is, that the Convention must have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential influence of party animosities — the diseases most incident to deliberative bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second conclusion is, that all the deputations composing the Convention were either satisfactorily accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede to it by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good, and by a despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays, or by new experiments.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 15, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XXXVII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

IT is not a little remarkable, that in every case reported by ancient history, in which Government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen, of præëminent wisdom and approved integrity.

MINOS, we learn, was the primitive founder of the Government of Crete; as ZALEUCUS was of that of the Locrians. THESEUS first, and after him DRACO and SOLON, instituted the Government of Athens. LYCURGUS was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the original Government of Rome was laid by ROMULUS;

and the work completed by two of his elective successors, NUMA, and TULLIUS HOSTILIUS. On the abolition of royalty, the Consular administration was substituted by BRUTUS, who stepped forward with a project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by TULLIUS HOSTILIUS, and to which his address obtained the assent and ratification of the Senate and People. This remark is applicable to Confederate Governments also. AMPHICTYON, we are told, was the author of that which bore his name. The Achæan league received its first birth from ACHÆUS, and its second from ARATUS.

What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the People, cannot, in every instance, be ascertained. In some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. DRACO appears to have been intrusted by the People of Athens with indefinite powers to reform its Government and laws. And SOLON, according to PLUTARCH, was in a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute power of new-modelling the Constitution. The proceedings under LYCURGUS were less regular; but as far as the advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring about a revolution, by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens.

Whence could it have proceeded, that a People, jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have proceeded, that the Athenians, a People who would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten Generals, and who required no other proof of danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen,

should consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their posterity, than a select body of citizens, from whose common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been expected? These questions cannot be fully answered, without supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of Counsellors, exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to contend; as well as of the expedients which they were obliged to employ, in order to carry their reforms into effect. SOLON, who seems to have indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to his countrymen the Government best suited to their happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And LYCURGUS, more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of superstition; and of securing his final success, by a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of Government: they serve not less on the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying them.

Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be contained in the plan of the Convention are such as have resulted rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it; and, consequently, such as will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of a general nature, but by the

particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It is observable that among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several States, when these Articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is found, which alludes to the great and radical error, which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we except the observations which New Jersey was led to make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether a single suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very dangerous inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of self-preservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several years in refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with protracting the public calamities, and endangering the event of the contest. Every candid reader will make the proper reflections on these important facts.

A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger, after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend: the case of the patient is carefully examined: a consultation is held: they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical; but that the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from being desperate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are equally unan-

imous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The prescription is no sooner made known, however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much from one another as from his first counsellors, would he not act prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing one?

Such a patient, and in such a situation, is America at this moment. She has been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned by others against following this advice, under pain of the most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No. Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us, that the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but a Government over individuals. Another admits, that it ought to be a Government over individuals, to a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the Government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a Bill of Rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute

necessity of a Bill of Rights, but contends, that it ought to be declaratory not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity. A fifth is of opinion, that a Bill of Rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable, but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to administer the new Government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is, that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation, and that the Government would be far less objectionable, if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and imports is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy: that is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities. With another class of adversaries to the Constitution, the language is, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments are intermixed in

such a manner, as to contradict all the ideas of regular Government, and all the requisite precautions in favor of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions, there are not a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward with his particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly agreed on the subject. In the eyes of one, the junction of the Senate with the President, in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this Executive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the admission of the President into any share of a power, which must ever be a dangerous engine in the hands of the Executive magistrate, is an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the Legislative and Executive departments, when this power so evidently belonged to the Judiciary department. "We concur fully," reply others, "in the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a reference of impeachments to the Judiciary authority would be an amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive powers already lodged in that department." Even among the zealous patrons of a Council of State the most irreconcilable variance is discovered, concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentleman is, that the Council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the Legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it as a fundamental condition, that the

appointment should be made by the President himself.

As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the Fœderal Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think the late Convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us further suppose, that their country should concur, both in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their unfavorable opinion of the Convention; and should accordingly proceed to form them into a second Convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors, they would, in any one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the discord and ferment that would mark their own deliberations; and whether the Constitution, now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance for immortality, as LYCURGUS gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but until ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of Lawgivers.

It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tot-

tering habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the Fæderal Government? The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please; and the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermingle the different powers of Government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the Fæderal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a Bill of Rights essential to liberty? The Confederation has no Bill of Rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress, without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.

I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture

of powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the States for the means of carrying them into practice : That however large the mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly, of declaring certain powers in the Fæderal Government to be absolutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory ; and, in the next place, that if the Union is to continue, and no better government be substituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing Congress ; in either of which events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the dangers that can be apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme Government of the Union. It is now no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United States ; and although it is not of such a nature as to extricate them from their present distresses, or, for some time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal tributes to the Fæderal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual States ; and it may with reason be expected, that the remaining States will not persist in withholding similar proofs of their equity and generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become a National stock. Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive. Congress have undertaken to do more :—they have proceeded to form new

States; to erect temporary Governments; to appoint officers for them; and to prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done: and done without the least color of Constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded. A GREAT AND INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS to an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And yet there are men, who have not only been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against the new system the objections which we have heard. Would they not act with more consistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less necessary to guard the Union against the future powers and resources of a body constructed like the existing Congress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly?

I mean not, by anything here said, to throw censure on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their Constitutional limits. But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger resulting from a Government, which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed.

PUBLIUS.

For the Independent Journal.

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XXXVIII.



TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

THE last paper having concluded the observations, which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of Government reported by the Convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.

The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the Government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the People of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the Convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.

What then are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the Constitutions of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the People, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the People is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified

with the same appellation. The Government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.

If we resort, for a criterion, to the different principles on which different forms of Government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a Government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the People, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is *essential* to such a Government, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their Government the honorable title of republic. It is *sufficient* for such a Government, that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the People; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every Government in the United States, as well as every other popular Government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the Constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of Government are appointed indirectly only by the People. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the coördinate branches of the Legislature. According to all the Constitutions, also,

the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the Legislative and Executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the Constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the Judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.

On comparing the Constitution planned by the Convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State Legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the People. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the People. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the People, according to the example in most of the States. Even the Judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the People themselves. The duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the Republican standard, and to the model of the State Constitutions. The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland; and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the Chief Magis-

trate. And in Delaware and Virginia, he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the Judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case, and the example of the State Constitutions.

Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the Fæderal and the State Governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.

“But it was not sufficient,” say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, “for the Convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the *Fæderal* form, which regards the Union as a *Confederacy* of sovereign States; instead of which, they have framed a *National* Government, which regards the Union as a *consolidation* of the States.” And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires, that it should be examined with some precision.

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, First, to ascertain the real character of the Government in question; Secondly, to inquire how far the Convention were authorized to propose such a Government; and Thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.

First. In order to ascertain the real character of the Government, it may be considered in relation to the

foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the Government are to be introduced.

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the People of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the People, not as individuals composing one entire Nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State,—the authority of the People themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a *National*, but a *Fæderal* act.

That it will be a Fæderal, and not a National act, as these terms are understood by the objectors, the act of the People, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate Nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a *majority* of the People of the Union, nor from that of a *majority* of the States. It must result from the *unanimous* assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the Legislative authority, but by that of the People themselves. Were the People regarded in this transaction as forming one Nation, the will of the majority of the whole People of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the

States as evidence of the will of a majority of the People of the United States. Neither of these rules has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a *Fæderal*, and not a *National* Constitution.

The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of Government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the People of America; and the People will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the Legislature of a particular State. So far the Government is *National*, not *Fæderal*. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the Government is *Fæderal*, not *National*. The Executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the Legislature which consists of the National representatives; but in this particular act, they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the Government, it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many *Fæderal* as *National* features.

The difference between a *Fæderal* and *National* Government, as it relates to the *operation of the Government*,

is supposed to consist in this, that in the former, the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the Nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the *National*, not the *Fæderal* character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the National countenance of the Government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few Fæderal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the Government on the People, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a *National* Government.

But if the Government be National with regard to the *operation* of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the *extent* of its powers. The idea of a National Government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful Government. Among a People consolidated into one Nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the National Legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general, and partly in the municipal Legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within

its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed Government cannot be deemed a *National* one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true, that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the General Government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the General, rather than under the local Governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly *National*, nor wholly *Fæderal*. Were it wholly *National*, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the *majority* of the People of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every *National* society, to alter or abolish its established Government. Were it wholly *Fæderal*, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the Plan of the Convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by *States*, not by *citizens*, it departs from the *National*, and advances towards the *Fæderal* character: in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole

number of States sufficient, it loses again the *Fæderal*, and partakes of the *National* character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a National nor a Fæderal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is Fæderal, not National: in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly Fæderal, and partly National: in the operation of these powers, it is National, not Fæderal: in the extent of them, again, it is Fæderal, not National: and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly Fæderal nor wholly National.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, January 18, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XXXIX.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE *second* point to be examined is, whether the Convention were authorized to frame, and propose this mixed Constitution.

The powers of the Convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular Acts.

The Act from Annapolis recommends the “appointment of Commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States ; to devise *such further*

“*provisions*, as shall appear to them necessary to render “the Constitution of the Fœderal Government *adequate to the exigencies of the Union*; and to report such an Act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the Legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same.”

The recommendatory Act of Congress is in the words following : “Whereas, there is provision in the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the Legislatures of the several States: And whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and particularly the State of New York, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a Convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such Convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States a firm National Government: —

“*Resolved*, — That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the 2d Monday of May next a Convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of *revising the Articles of Confederation*, and reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures such *alterations and provisions therein*, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the Fœderal Constitution *adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union*.”

From these two Acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the Convention was to establish, in these States, a firm National Government; 2d, that this Government was to be such as would be *adequate to the exigencies*

of Government, and the preservation of the Union; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by *alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation*, as it is expressed in the Act of Congress; or by *such further provisions as should appear necessary*, as it stands in the recommendatory Act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter.

From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the Convention acted. They were to frame a *National Government*, adequate to the *exigencies of Government, and of the Union*; and to reduce the Articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes.

There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part: the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means.

Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the Convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a *National and adequate Government* could not possibly, in the judgment of the Convention, be effected by *alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation*; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those

exercised by the Convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the People of America, that the Articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate Government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate Government should be omitted, and the Articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these Articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the Government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a Government, adequate to the National happiness, was the end at which these Articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed.

But is it necessary to suppose, that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no *alterations* or *provisions* in the *Articles of the Confederation*, could possibly mould them into a National and adequate Government; into such a Government as has been proposed by the Convention?

No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the *title*; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. *Alterations* in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. *New provisions* therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the Title; to insert new Articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted, that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old Articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative, ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of *alterations and further provisions*, and that which amounts to a *transmutation* of the Government. Will it be said, that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have appointed a

Convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some *substantial* reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the *fundamental principles* of the Confederation were not within the purview of the Convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require, that in the establishment of the Constitution the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require, that the members of the Government should derive their appointment from the Legislatures, not from the People of the States? One branch of the new Government is to be appointed by these Legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress *may all* be appointed immediately by the People, and in two States* are actually so appointed. Do they require, that the powers of the Government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new Government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing Government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post-office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land, by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by Courts-martial in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil Magistrate; in all these cases, the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied, without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the

* Connecticut and Rhode Island. — *Publius*.

post-office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermittting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the Convention, and the universal expectation of the People, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the General Government, in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure, as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress, as to recognize the *principle* of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the General Government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen, that in the new Government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.

The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the Convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the Articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined, as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it; and to require a degree of enlargement, which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old.

In one particular, it is admitted that the Convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation of *the Legislatures of all the States*, they have reported a plan, which is to be confirmed by the *People*, and may

be carried into effect by *nine States only*. It is worthy of remark, that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the Convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a *majority* of one sixtieth of the People of America, to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the People; an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the Convention, I dismiss it without further observation.

The *third* point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority.

In the preceding inquiries, the powers of the Convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers, for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen, in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect, that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the Convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution, which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the Convention.

Let us view the ground on which the Convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced, that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them, that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe, that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the *proposition*, made by a single State, (Virginia,) towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the *liberty assumed* by a *very few* deputies, from a *very few* States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory but of operative powers, warranted in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established Governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the People to "abolish or

“alter their Governments as to them shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness,”* since it is impossible for the People spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential, that such changes be instituted by some *informal and unauthorized propositions*, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen, or number of citizens. They must have recollected, that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege, of proposing to the People plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient Government; that Committees and Congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts, and defending their rights; and that *Conventions* were *elected in the several States*, for establishing the Constitutions under which they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the *People themselves*, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever: its approbation blot out all antecedent errors and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the National exigencies.

Had the Convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose

* Declaration of Independence. — *Publius*.

confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable in their judgment of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask, what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who *usurped the power* of sending deputies to the Convention, a body utterly unknown to their Constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular, who first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition?

But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a moment, that the Convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much *from whom* the advice comes, as whether the advice be *good*.

The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the Convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the

objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the People of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation.

PUBLIUS.

For the Independent Journal.

THE FœDERALIST. No. XL.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE Constitution proposed by the Convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the Government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the Government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches.

Under the first view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the General Government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?

Is the aggregate power of the General Government

greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the first question.

It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the Government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the People of America. It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.

That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the Government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regula-

tion of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.

The powers falling within the first class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.

Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the Fæderal councils.

Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form.

Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defence.

But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war?

The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another place, to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive, as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defence be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence? If a Fæderal Constitution could chain the ambition, or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its

own Government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will in fact be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose Constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations, who may be within the reach of its enterprises, to take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in time of peace. They were introduced by CHARLES VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into the example. Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch. Were every nation, except France, now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and rendered her the mistress of the world.

Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary provision. On the smallest scale, it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. On

any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one, which may be inauspicious to its liberties.

The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition, than America, disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world, gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united People. But let it never, for a moment, be forgotten, that they are indebted for this advantage to their Union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as CHARLES VII. did in the Old World. The example will be followed here, from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of

America will be but a copy of that of the Continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In America, the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.

This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.

Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat here the observations, which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said, that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of the Legislature: whereas the American Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the form in which the comparison

is usually stated to the public: but is it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the Parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the Legislature, and that the American ties down the Legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term.

Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by Parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the Representatives, and the Representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the Representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the Representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by the WHOLE BODY of the People, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with a discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS?

A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition to the Fæderal Government is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the People, of

standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public attention to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the Constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the National defence, and the preservation of the Union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation of these establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the People, as any establishment that can become necessary, under a united and efficient Government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.

The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy, has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must indeed be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect, our situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious Government against our liberties.

The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and

sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing Government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their Eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her sea-coast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a General Government which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them.

The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.

The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the National defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the

Constitution. I will address one additional reflection, only, to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to external taxation — by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted, that this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time, it must be a principal source; that at this moment, it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of Government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them.

Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,” amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power, which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defence

or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.

Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare."

But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural or common, than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Consti-

tution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.

The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the Convention is a copy from the Articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in Article third, are, "their common defence, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms of Article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war, and all other expenses, that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," &c. A similar language again occurs in Article ninth. Construe either of these Articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defence and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress, as they now make use of against the Convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 22, 1788.*]

THE FØDERALIST. No. XLI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE *second* class of powers, lodged in the General Government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make Treaties; to send and receive Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations.

This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the Fæderal administration. If we are to be one Nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other Nations.

The powers to make Treaties, and to send and receive Ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation; with this difference only, that the former is disembarassed by the plan of the Convention of an exception, under which Treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving "other public Ministers and Consuls," is expressly and very properly added to the former provision concerning Ambassadors. The term Ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of the Articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only of public Ministers; and excludes the grades

which the United States will be most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend Consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior grades of public Ministers; and to send and receive Consuls.

It is true, that where Treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual appointment of Consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign Consuls may fall within the power of making commercial Treaties; and that where no such Treaties exist, the mission of American Consuls into foreign countries may *perhaps* be covered under the authority, given by the ninth Article of the Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States. But the admission of Consuls into the United States, where no previous Treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances, in which the Convention have improved on the model before them. But the most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject; and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the old.

The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the General

Government, and is a still greater improvement on the Articles of Confederation. These Articles contain no provision for the case of offences against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations. The provision of the Fæderal Articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offences. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common, nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in the codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case was in every respect necessary and proper.

The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the Fæderal administration.

It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather, that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the Gen-

eral Government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy ; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the Fæderal Government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren !

Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another, as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none ; but as specimens of the manner and spirit, in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed Government.

The powers included in the *third* class are those which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States.

Under this head might be included the particular restraints imposed on the authority of the States, and certain powers of the Judicial department ; but the former are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be particularly examined, when we arrive at the structure and organization of the Government. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers comprehended under this third description, to wit : to regulate commerce among the several States and the

Indian tribes; to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and securities of the United States; to fix the standard of weights and measures; to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy; to prescribe the manner in which the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States; and to establish post-offices and post-roads.

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added, that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen, that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter, and the consumers of the former. We may be assured, by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion, or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear

not less impolitic than it is unfair ; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain.

The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of Confederated States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each Canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other Cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany, it is a law of the Empire, that the Princes and States shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the Emperor and Diet ; though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in that Confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general permission.

The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled ; and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the Fæderal Councils. And how the trade

with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case, in which the Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain.

All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the Articles of Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the regulation of coin *struck* by their own authority, or that of the respective States. It must be seen at once, that the proposed uniformity in the *value* of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different States.

The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the current coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both.

The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the Articles of Confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the preceding power of regulating coin.

The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth Article of the Confederation, it is declared, "that the *free inhabitants* of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, "shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of "*free citizens* in the several States; and *the People* of

“each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce,” &c. There is a confusion of language here, which is remarkable. Why the terms *free inhabitants* are used in one part of the Article, *free citizens* in another, and *People* in another; or what was meant by superadding to “all privileges and immunities of free citizens,” “all the privileges of trade and commerce,” cannot easily be determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those who come under the denomination of *free inhabitants* of a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every other State, to all the privileges of *free citizens* of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own State: so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an exposition of the term “inhabitants” to be admitted which would confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not removed. The very improper power would still be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State, residence for a short term confers all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater importance are required. An alien, therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one State be preposterously rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction of the other. We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under inter-

dicts inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship, but with the privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the State prescribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature, not to be provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the Confederation, on this head, by authorizing the General Government to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.

The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.

The power of prescribing, by general laws, the manner in which the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State, shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the Articles of Confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate; and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.

The power of establishing post-roads must, in every

view, be a harmless power; and may perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care.

PUBLIUS.

[*For the Independent Journal.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XLII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

THE *fourth* class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:

1. A power "to promote the progress of science and "useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors "and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective "writings and discoveries."

The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.

2. "To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles "square) as may, by cession of particular States and "the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the

“ Government of the United States ; and to exercise like
“ authority over all places purchased by the consent of
“ the Legislatures of the States in which the same shall
“ be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-
“ yards, and other needful buildings.”

The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of Government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings be interrupted with impunity ; but a dependence of the members of the General Government on the State comprehending the seat of the Government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the National Councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the Government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the Government, would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the Government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this Fœderal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it ; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it ; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession ; as they will have had their voice in the election of the Government, which is to exercise authority over them ; as a municipal Legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them ; and as the authority of the

Legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole People of the State, in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated.

The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, &c., established by the General Government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require, that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned, in every such establishment.

3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted."

As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free Governments, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the Convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a Constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author.

4. "To admit new States into the Union: but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of

“ States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.”

In the Articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States ; and the other *colonies*, by which were evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual establishment of *new States* seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it. With great propriety therefore has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new States shall be formed, without the concurrence of the Fæderal authority, and that of the States concerned, is consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the erection of new States, by the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States ; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States without their consent.

5. “ To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”

This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations, similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public.

6. “ To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of Government ; to protect each of them

“ against invasion ; and on application of the Legislature, “ or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be “ convened,) against domestic violence.”

In a Confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending Government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a Union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other ; and the greater right to insist, that the forms of Government under which the compact was entered into, should be *substantially* maintained. But a right implies a remedy ; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution ? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a Fæderal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. “ As the Confederate republic of “ Germany,” says MONTESQUIEU, “ consists of free Cities, “ and petty States, subject to different Princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of “ Holland and Switzerland.” “ Greece was undone,” he adds, “ as soon as the King of Macedon obtained a “ seat among the Amphictyons.” In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form of the new Confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State Governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the General Government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enter-

prising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the General Government should interpose by virtue of this Constitutional authority, it will be of course bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no farther than to a *guaranty* of a republican form of Government, which supposes a pre-existing Government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the Fæderal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the Fæderal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.

A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used, seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern Confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the Union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this Article.

Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss Cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one Government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that League informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other Cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature.

At first view, it might seem not to square with the

republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a Government; and consequently, that the Fæderal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State, as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought in the latter case to protect the local magistracy, ought not the Fæderal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State Constitutions, which are so interwoven with the Fæderal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one, without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a Fæderal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of Government. It will be much better, that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.

Is it true, that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican Governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine, that in a trial of actual force, victory may be

calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the Constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular Government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.

In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of Confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of Judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be, if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free Governments; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!

Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a Constitutional right; the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the Fæderal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity, for which no possible Constitution can provide a cure.

Among the advantages of a Confederate republic, enumerated by MONTESQUIEU, an important one is, "that

“should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound.”

7. “To consider all debts contracted, and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, as being no less valid against the United States, under this Constitution, than under the Confederation.”

This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition; and may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doctrine, that a change in the political form of civil society, has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations.

Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on the Constitution, it has been remarked, that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favor of the United States, as well as against them; and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has been transformed and magnified into a plot against the National rights. The authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be informed of, that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and that as the Article is merely declaratory, the establishment of the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. They may be further told, that every Constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imaginary; and that no real danger can exist that the Government would DARE, with, or even without, this Constitutional declaration before it, to remit the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext here condemned.

8. "To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths of the States, under two exceptions only."

That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the Convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It moreover equally enables the General and the State Governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the Legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the privilege defended by it.

9. "The ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States, ratifying the same."

This Article speaks for itself. The express authority of the People alone could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the Convention, which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable.

Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion:—1. On what principle the Con-

federation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become parties to it?

The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere Legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocity seems to require, that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of Legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the Articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one Article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the Fæderal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been, when it was incumbent on us all to veil

the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate.

The second question is not less delicate; and the flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical, forbids an over-curious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncanceled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODERATION on one side, and PRUDENCE on the other.

PUBLIUS.

[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 25, 1788.]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XLIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

A *FIFTH* class of provisions in favor of the Fæderal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States.

1. "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, *ex post facto* law, or law

“impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any “title of nobility.”

The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations, makes a part of the existing Articles of Union; and, for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is somewhat extended in the new. According to the former, letters of marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of war; according to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during war, as previous to its declaration, from the Government of the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the Nation in all those, for whose conduct the Nation itself is to be responsible.

The right of coining money, which is here taken from the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation, as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the general authority, a right of coinage in the particular States could have no other effect than to multiply expensive mints, and diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which the power was originally submitted to the Fæderal head: and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local mints established under the general authority.

The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of

public prosperity. The loss which America has sustained since the Peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of the People, and on the character of republican Government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasons which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force, that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium, in the place of coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency.

Bills of attainder, *ex post facto* laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the

State Constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the Convention added this Constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived, if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober People of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and with indignation, that sudden changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one Legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society. The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is copied from the Articles of Confederation, and needs no comment.

2. "No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on

“tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace ;
“enter into any agreement or compact with another
“State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless
“actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will
“not admit of delay.”

The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the Fæderal councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion. The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark.

The *sixth* and last class consists of the several powers and provisions, by which efficacy is given to all the rest.

1. “Of these the first is, the power to make all laws
“which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
“execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
“vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
“United States.”

Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this ; yet on a fair investigation of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the *substance* of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the Article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the *form* of the provision is improper. But have they considered, whether a better form could have been substituted ?

There are four other possible methods, which the Convention might have taken on this subject. They might

have copied the second Article of the existing Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not *expressly* delegated; they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms "necessary and proper;" they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference.

Had the Convention taken the first method of adopting the second Article of Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term "*expressly*" with so much rigor, as to disarm the Government of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restriction. It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important power, delegated by the Articles of Confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of *construction* or *implication*. As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the Government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interest by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not *expressly* granted.

Had the Convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every

new application of a general power, the *particular powers*, which are the means of attaining the *object* of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object; and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described the residue by the general terms, *not necessary or proper*, it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be least likely to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course select such as would be least necessary or proper; and that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had been made.

Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the Government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued by the Convention, every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all its plausibility; and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union.

If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated; the same in short, as if the State Legislatures should violate their respective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the Executive and Judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the People, who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the Fæderal, than of the State Legislatures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the People, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of Fæderal representatives. There being no such intermediate body between the State Legislatures and the People, interested in watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State Constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed.

2. "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it

also, without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment, that the supremacy of the State Constitutions had been left complete, by a saving clause in their favor.

In the first place, as these Constitutions invest the State Legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing Articles of Confederation, all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their predecessors.

In the next place, as the Constitutions of some of the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution.

In the third place, as the Constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it might happen that a treaty or National law, of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other Constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same time that it would have no effect in others.

In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of Government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all Government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.

3. "The Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all Executive and Judicial officers, both of the United States

“and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution.”

It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy should be bound to support the Fæderal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor of the State Constitutions?

Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the Fæderal Government will have no agency in carrying the State Constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State Governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Fæderal Constitution. The election of the President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the Legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and according to the laws of the States.

4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the Fæderal powers might be added those which belong to the Executive and Judiciary departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass them over in this.

We have now reviewed, in detail, all the Articles composing the sum or quantity of power, delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Fæderal Government; and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a Government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved.

PUBLIUS.

For the Independent Journal.

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XLIV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the Federal Government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.

The adversaries to the plan of the Convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the Fæderal Government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the Governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the People of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the People of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a Government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a Government may derogate from the importance of the Governments of the individual States? Was then the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the Peo-

ple of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety; but that the Governments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of Sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the People were made for kings, not kings for the People. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape, that the solid happiness of the People is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the People, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of Government whatever has any other value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the Convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the People, the voice of every good citizen must be, let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us.

Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition, that the operation of the Fæderal Government will by degrees prove fatal to the State Governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded, that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.

We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern Confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the General

Government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achæan league it is probable that the Fæderal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the Government framed by the Convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us, that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated Government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the Fæderal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other.

In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the People, and the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalry for encroachments. Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the People, the great kingdoms in Europe would at

this time consist of as many independent princes, as there were formerly feudatory barons.

The State Governments will have the advantage of the Fæderal Government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the predilection and probable support of the People; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.

The State Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the Fæderal Government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State Legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State Legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the People, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the People obtains for themselves an election into the State Legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the Fæderal Government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State Governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, than too overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State Governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the Fæderal Government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.

The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller

than the number employed under the particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the Fæderal system. Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the Judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members of the corresponding departments of the single Government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three millions of people, with the military and marine officers of any establishment, which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. If the Fæderal Government is to have collectors of revenue, the State Governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on the sea-coast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States: but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union,

will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed, it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the Judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the Fæderal Government, the influence of the whole number would not be a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. Within every district, to which a Fæderal collector would be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers, of different descriptions, and many of them persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State.

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Fæderal Government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the People, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.

The operations of the Fæderal Government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State Governments will here enjoy another advantage over the Fæderal Government. The more adequate, indeed, the Fæderal powers may be rendered to the National defence, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might

favor their ascendancy over the Governments of the particular States.

If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important: and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defence and general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied punctually with the Articles of Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that the State Governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence of the State Governments is incompatible with any system whatever, that accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 29, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XLV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire, whether the Fæderal Government or the State Governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the People. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The Fæderal and State Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the People, constituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the People altogether, in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior, in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told, that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the People alone; and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different Governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires, that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents.

Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the first and most natural attachment of the People will be to the Governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these, a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these, a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the People will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the People will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these will a greater proportion of the People have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.

Experience speaks the same language in this case. The Fæderal administration, though hitherto very defective, in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have, in any future circumstances whatever. It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the People at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the People were turned anew to their own particular Governments; that the Fæderal Council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men, who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens.

If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the People should in future become more partial to the Fæderal than to the State Governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the People ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case, the State Governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere, that the Fæderal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.

The remaining points, on which I propose to compare the Fæderal and State Governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other.

It has been already proved, that the members of the Fæderal will be more dependent on the members of the State Governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the People, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State Governments, than of the Fæderal Government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State Governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the Fæderal Government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State Governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the General Government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a National spirit will prevail in the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows, that a great proportion of the errors committed

by the State Legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined, that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its Government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State Legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to National objects, the members of the Fœderal Legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter, what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the National prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the Governments and People of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations to the aggrandizement of the Fœderal Government, the great interests of the Nation have suffered on an hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new Fœderal Government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing Government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State Legislatures; but

only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their Governments. The motives on the part of the State Governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the Fæderal Government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members.

Were it admitted, however, that the Fæderal Government may feel an equal disposition with the State Governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the National Government, be generally popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and of course by means on the spot, and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the Fæderal Government, or the interposition of Fæderal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the Fæderal Government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the People; their repugnance, and perhaps refusal, to coöperate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the Executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by Legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present

obstructions which the Fœderal Government would hardly be willing to encounter.

But ambitious encroachments of the Fœderal Government, on the authority of the State Governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every Government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combination, in short, would result from an apprehension of the Fœderal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case, as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the Fœderal Government to such an extremity? In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest, in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the People would be opposed to the People themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter.

The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State Governments is the visionary supposition that the Fœderal Government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the People and the States should, for a sufficient

period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the Governments and the People of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Fæderal Government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State Governments, with the People on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by Governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the late successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the

People of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate Governments, to which the People are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier, against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple Government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the Governments are afraid to trust the People with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone, they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the People to possess the additional advantages of local Governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the National will, and direct the National force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these Governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition, that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.

The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the Fæderal Government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the People, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents.

On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the People, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State Governments, who will be supported by the People.

On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the Fœderal Government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State Governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.*]

THE FœDERALIST. No. XLVI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed Government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this Government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.

One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the Fœderal Government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty

The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner, as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts.

No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the Fœderal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires, that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.

The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated MONTESQUIEU. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point.

The British Constitution was to MONTESQUIEU what HOMER has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal Bard as the perfect model from which the principles

and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged : so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty ; and to have delivered in the form of elementary truths the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn.

On the slightest view of the British Constitution we must perceive that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The Executive magistrate forms an integral part of the Legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of Legislative acts. All the members of the Judiciary department are appointed by him ; can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament ; and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional Councils. One branch of the Legislative department forms also a great constitutional Council to the Executive chief ; as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the Legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a Legislative vote.

From these facts, by which MONTESQUIEU was guided, it may clearly be inferred, that in saying, "There can be no liberty, where the Legislative and Executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the Legislative and Executive powers,"

he did not mean that these departments ought to have no *partial agency* in, or no *control* over the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the *whole* power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the *whole* power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the Constitution examined by him, if the King, who is the sole Executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete Legislative power, or the supreme administration of Justice; or if the entire Legislative body had possessed the supreme Judiciary, or the supreme Executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that Constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole Executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no Executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the Executive stock; nor any Legislative function, though they may be advised with by the Legislative Councils. The entire Legislature can perform no Judiciary act; though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices; and though one of its branches is possessed of the Judicial power in the last resort. The entire Legislature again can exercise no Executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme Executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the Executive department.

The reasons on which MONTESQUIEU grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the Legislative and Executive powers are united

“in the same person or body,” says he, “there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest *the same* monarch or Senate should *enact* tyrannical laws to *execute* them in a tyrannical manner.” Again, “Were the power of judging joined with the Legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for *the Judge* would then be *the Legislator*. Were it joined to the Executive power, *the Judge* might behave with all the violence of *an oppressor*.” Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.

If we look into the Constitutions of the several States, we find, that, notwithstanding the emphatical, and in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose Constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments; and has qualified the doctrine by declaring, “that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of each other, *as the nature of a free Government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection, that binds the whole fabric of the Constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity and amity.*” Her Constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the Legislative department, is also a Judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the head of the Executive department, is the presiding member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting

vote in case of a tie. The Executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the Legislative department; and his Council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of State are also appointed by the Legislature. And the members of the Judiciary department are appointed by the Executive department.

The Constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental Article of liberty. It declares, "that the Legislative department shall never exercise the Executive and Judicial powers, or either of them: the Executive shall never exercise the Legislative and Judicial powers, or either of them: the Judicial shall never exercise the Legislative and Executive powers or either of them." This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of MONTESQUIEU, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the Convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The Executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the Legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the Legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the Executive and Judiciary departments. The members of the Judiciary department, again, are appointable by the Executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two Legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of Government are annually appointed by the Legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly Executive offices, is in its nature an Executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves.

I pass over the Constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention.

The Constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the Executive magistrate, a partial control over the Legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like control to the Judiciary department; and even blends the Executive and Judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its Council of Appointment, members of the Legislative are associated with the Executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both Executive and Judiciary. And its Court for the trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, is to consist of one branch of the Legislature and the principal members of the Judiciary department.

The Constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of Government more than any of the preceding. The Governor, who is the Executive magistrate, is appointed by the Legislature; is Chancellor and Ordinary, or Surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and President, with a casting vote, of one of the Legislative branches. The same Legislative branch acts again as Executive Council of the Governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the Judiciary department are appointed by the Legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other.

According to the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the President, who is the head of the Executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the Legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an

Executive Council, he appoints the members of the Judiciary department, and forms a court of impeachment for trial of all officers, Judiciary as well as Executive. The judges of the Supreme Court, and justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the Legislature; and the Executive power of pardoning in certain cases to be referred to the same department. The members of the Executive Council are made *EX OFFICIO* justices of peace throughout the State.

In Delaware, the chief Executive magistrate is annually elected by the Legislative department. The Speakers of the two Legislative branches are Vice-presidents in the Executive department. The Executive chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the Legislative branches, constitute the Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the Legislative department in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States, it appears that the members of the Legislature may at the same time be justices of the peace; in this State, the members of one branch of it are *EX OFFICIO* justices of the peace; as are also the members of the Executive Council. The principal officers of the Executive department are appointed by the Legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a Court of Impeachments. All officers may be removed on address of the Legislature.

Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her Constitution, notwithstanding, makes the Executive magistrate appointable by the Legislative department; and the members of the Judiciary by the Executive department.

The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her Constitution declares, "that the Legisla-

“tive, Executive, and Judiciary departments shall be
“separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the pow-
“ers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any per-
“son exercise the powers of more than one of them
“at the same time; except that the justices of county
“courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly.”

Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the inferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his Executive Council, are appointable by the Legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the Legislature; and that all the principal offices, both Executive and Judiciary, are filled by the same department. The Executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the Legislative department.

The Constitution of North Carolina, which declares, “that the Legislative, Executive, and supreme Judicial
“powers of Government ought to be forever separate
“and distinct from each other,” refers, at the same time, to the Legislative department, the appointment not only of the Executive chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the Judiciary department.

In South Carolina, the Constitution makes the Executive magistracy eligible by the Legislative department. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the Judiciary department, including even justices of the peace and sheriffs: and the appointment of officers in the Executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.

In the Constitution of Georgia, where it is declared, “that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary depart-
“ments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither
“exercise the powers properly belonging to the other,” we find that the Executive department is to be filled by appointments of the Legislature; and the Executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same

authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the Legislature.

In citing these cases in which the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State Governments. I am fully aware, that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious, that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating a sacred maxim of free Government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XLVII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

IT was shown in the last paper, that the political aphthegm there examined does not require that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments should

be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake in the next place to show, that unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free Government, can never in practice be duly maintained.

It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that neither of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power as they may in their nature be Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.

Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the Government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American Constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defence is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the Government. The Legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.

The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, however, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the Legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from Legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by Executive usurpations.

In a Government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the Executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the Legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their Executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic, where the Executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the Legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the People, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the People ought to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all their precautions.

The Legislative department derives a superiority in our Governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the coördinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in Legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not extend beyond the Legislative sphere. On the other side, the Executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the Judiciary being described by landmarks, still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all: as the Legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the People, and has in some Constitutions full discretion, and in all, a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former.

I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied without end. I might find a witness in every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public administrations. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and at the same time equally satisfactory evidence, I will refer to the example of two States, attested by two unexceptionable authorities.

The first example is that of Virginia, a State which, as we have seen, has expressly declared in its Constitution, that the three great departments ought not to be inter-

mixed. The authority in support of it is Mr. JEFFERSON, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the Government, was himself the chief magistrate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his very interesting "Notes on the State of Virginia," p. 195. "All the powers of Government, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, result to the Legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the definition, of despotic Government. It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that they are chosen by ourselves. An *elective despotism* was not the Government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of Government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. For this reason, that Convention which passed the ordinance of Government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. *But no barrier was provided between these several powers.* The Judiciary and Executive members were left dependent on the Legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If, therefore, the Legislature assumes Executive and Judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can be effectual; because in that case they may put their proceed-

“ing into the form of an Act of Assembly, which will
“render them obligatory on the other branches. They
“have accordingly, *in many instances, decided rights,*
“which should have been left to *Judiciary controversy;*
“and *the direction of the Executive, during the whole*
“*time of their session, is becoming habitual and familiar.*”

The other State which I shall take for an example is Pennsylvania; and the other authority, the Council of Censors which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this body, as marked out by the Constitution, was “to inquire, whether the Constitution
“had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether
“the Legislative and Executive branches of Government
“had performed their duty as guardians of the People,
“or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater
“powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution.” In the execution of this trust, the Council were necessarily led to a comparison of both the Legislative and Executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these departments; and from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most of which both sides in the Council subscribed, it appears, that the Constitution had been flagrantly violated by the Legislature in a variety of important instances.

A great number of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration of the People; although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the Constitution against improper acts of the Legislature.

The constitutional trial by jury had been violated; and powers assumed, which had not been delegated by the Constitution.

Executive powers had been usurped.

The salaries of the Judges, which the Constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally

varied; and cases belonging to the Judiciary department frequently drawn within Legislative cognizance and determination.

Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under each of these heads, may consult the Journals of the Council, which are in print. Some of them, it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war; but the greater part of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted Government.

It appears, also, that the Executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the Constitution. There are three observations, however, which ought to be made on this head: *First*, A great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended by Congress, or the Commander-in-chief; *Secondly*, In most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the Legislative department; *Thirdly*, The Executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States, by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity to a Legislative assembly, as to an Executive Council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would of course be more freely hazarded, than where the Executive department is administered by a single hand, or by a few hands.

The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of Government in the same hands.

PUBLIUS.

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XLVIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE author of the "Notes on the State of Virginia," quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a Constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a Convention expected to be called in 1783, by the Legislature, for the establishment of a Constitution for that Commonwealth. The plan, like everything from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican Government, and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded. One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of power, against the invasions of the stronger is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked.

His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three branches of Government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a Convention is necessary for altering the Constitution, or *correcting breaches of it*, a Convention shall be called for the purpose."

As the People are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of Government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the

republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the Government; but also whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The several departments being perfectly coördinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the People themselves, who, as the grantors of the commission, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance?

There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove, that a constitutional road to the decision of the People ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the People, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional limits.

In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against a third. If the Legislative authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the remaining department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this objection, because it may be thought to lie rather against the modification of the principle, than against the principle itself.

In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to

the People would carry an implication of some defect in the Government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the Government of that veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest Governments would not possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all Governments rest on opinion, it is no less true, that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone; and acquires firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are *ancient*, as well as *numerous*, they are known to have a double effect. In a Nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a Nation of philosophers is as little to be expected, as the philosophical race of kings wished for by PLATO. And in every other Nation, the most rational Government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side.

The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of our established forms of Government, and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelligence of the People of America, it must be confessed, that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect, that all the existing Constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly

to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the People in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great National questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and indignation against the ancient Government; and whilst no spirit of party, connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.

But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the Government. We have seen that the tendency of republican Governments is to an aggrandizement of the Legislative, at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the People, therefore, would usually be made by the Executive and Judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the Executive and Judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the People. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the People to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy; and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the Legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the People at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance, embrace a great proportion of the most

influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the People, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the People. With these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.

But the Legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the People. They would probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained them an election into the Legislature, would gain them a seat in the Convention. If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies. The Convention, in short, would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected to be, members of the department whose conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties to the very question to be decided by them.

It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under circumstances less adverse to the Executive and Judiciary departments. The usurpations of the Legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden, as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves might take side with the other branches. The Executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar favorite of the People. In such a posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the Legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of preëxisting parties, or of parties springing out of the question itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished character, and extensive influ-

ence in the community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of the measures, to which the decision would relate. The *passions*, therefore, not the *reason*, of the public, would sit in judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone, that ought to control and regulate the Government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the Government.

We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the written Constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal limits. It appears in this, that occasional appeals to the People would be neither a proper, nor an effectual provision for that purpose. How far the provisions of a different nature contained in the plan above quoted might be adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are unquestionably founded on sound political principles, and all of them are framed with singular ingenuity and precision.

PUBLIUS.

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. XLIX.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

IT may be contended, perhaps, that instead of *occasional* appeals to the People, which are liable to the objections urged against them, *periodical* appeals are the proper and adequate means of *preventing and correcting infractions of the Constitution*.

It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for

enforcing the Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering them as provisions for *altering* the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the People at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligible, as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses, to which it might be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be imagined, that a Legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses would often have completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated.

The scheme of revising the Constitution, in order to correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects of the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania, in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen,

to inquire, "whether the Constitution had been violated; "and whether the Legislative and Executive departments "had encroached on each other." This important and novel experiment in politics merits, in several points of view, very particular attention. In some of them it may perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. But as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning which I have employed.

First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the Council, that some, at least, of its most active and leading members had also been active and leading characters in the parties which præexisted in the State.

Secondly. It appears, that the same active and leading members of the Council had been active and influential members of the Legislative and Executive branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the Constitution. Two of the members had been Vice-presidents of the State, and several others members of the Executive Council, within the seven preceding years. One of them had been Speaker, and a number of others distinguished members of the Legislative assembly, within the same period.

Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the Council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected

with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the same time, without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, *passion*, not *reason*, must have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely, on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.

Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits prescribed for the Legislative and Executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places.

Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of the Council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice founded on Legislative constructions. It even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary Legislature denied the constructions of the Council, and actually prevailed in the contest.

This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy.

This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other State, at the same or any other given period, will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either

a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty.

Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the People, to revise the preceding administration of the Government, all persons who should have been concerned in the Government within the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated. The important task would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little better qualified. Although they might not have been personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be examined, they would probably have been involved in the parties connected with these measures, and have been elected under their auspices.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. L.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

TO what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the Government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few gen-

eral observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the Government planned by the Convention.

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of Government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the People, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice, than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the Judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the Executive magistrate, or the Judges,

not independent of the Legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.

But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of Government. But what is Government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on Government would be necessary. In framing a Government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the Government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself: A dependence on the People is, no doubt, the primary control on the Government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These

inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.

But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defence. In republican Government, the Legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the Legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the Legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the Executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the Legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defence with which the Executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe, nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions, it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness; and on extraordinary occasions, it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?

If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State Constitutions, and to the Fæderal Constitution, it will be found, that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.

There are moreover two considerations particularly applicable to the Fæderal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.

First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the People is submitted to the administration of a single Government; and the usurpations are guarded against, by a division of the Government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the People is first divided between two distinct Governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the People. The different Governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

Second. It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all Governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the Fæderal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in

it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free Government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases, will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of People comprehended under the same Government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper Fæderal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican Government; since it shows, that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated; the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished; and consequently, the stability and independence of some member of the Government, the only other security, must be proportionally increased. Justice is the end of Government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society, under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a Government which may protect the weak, as well as themselves: so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by

a like motive, to wish for a Government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted, that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy, and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of Government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities, that some power altogether independent of the People would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the Government a will not dependent on the latter: or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the *republican cause*, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the *Fæderal principle*.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LI.



TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the Government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives.

The first view to be taken of this part of the Government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected.

Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican Government. It was incumbent on the Convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the Legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State Governments, that branch of the Fæderal Government which ought to be dependent on the People alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States, as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision made by the Convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State; because it is conformable

to the standard already established, or which may be established by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States; because, being fixed by the State Constitutions, it is not alterable by the State Governments, and it cannot be feared that the People of the States will alter this part of their Constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the Fæderal Constitution.

The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State Constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the Convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Fæderal Government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.

The term for which the Representatives are to be elected, falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this Article, two questions must be considered: First, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; Secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.

First. As it is essential to liberty, that the Government in general should have a common interest with the People; so it is particularly essential, that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with the People. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy

can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed, whenever it can be found.

The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only, that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove, that Parliaments were to *sit* only every year; not that they were to be *elected* every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of CHARLES II., that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of WILLIAM III., when a revolution took place in the Government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the People, that Parliaments ought to be held *frequently*. By another statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term, "frequently,"

which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of CHARLES II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted, that a new Parliament shall be called within three years after the determination of the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears, that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the Representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the Parliamentary Constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the People over their Representatives as to satisfy us, that biennial elections, under the Fœderal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents.

Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new Prince, or some other contingent event. The Parliament which commenced with GEORGE II. was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of the Representatives on the People consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies, by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish Parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of late, these shackles, if I mistake not, have

been broken; and octennial Parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the People of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their Representatives and themselves.

Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch of the Legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer from the spirit and conduct of the Representatives of the People, prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself, at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles to Independence, is the best of proofs, that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed, to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the Parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public Act, the resolution of Independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former Government were septennial. This particu-

lar example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in *septennial* elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the People can be in no danger from *biennial* elections.

The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened, by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the Fæderal Legislature will possess a part only of that supreme Legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial Assemblies, and the Irish Legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown, that the Fæderal Legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the People as other Legislative bodies are, but that it will be more-over watched and controlled by the several collateral Legislatures, which other Legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the Fæderal Government, for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the People, and the means of influence over the popular branch, possessed by the other branches of the Government above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the Fæderal Representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.*]

THE FØEDERALIST. No. LII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins.” If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State Legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other

States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial; as is proposed in the Fæderal Government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one or the other of these States are distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.

In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the People, and unalterable by the Government, and a law established by the Government and alterable by the Government, seems to have been little understood, and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the Government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained, that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent, and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of Legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed by Legislative Acts, some of the most fundamental Articles of the Government. They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same Act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the People. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the vota-

ries of free Government, of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the Government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the National sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited Government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a Government, limited as the Fæderal Government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the People of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other Nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the Government?

The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful? The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative, will appear from several very obvious considerations.

No man can be a competent Legislator, who does not add, to an upright intention and a sound judgment, a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which

he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private, as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge, requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of Legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for Fæderal Legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State Legislation? The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it.

In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws, which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place, than in the central councils, to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the Representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the

States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed, and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of Fæderal Legislation, and suggest, most forcibly, the extensive information which the Representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them.

It is true, that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the Government, and the primeval formation of a Fæderal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the Government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the business of Fæderal Legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the Legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.

A branch of knowledge, which belongs to the acquirements of a Fæderal Representative, and which has not been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal Legislation, is submitted to the Fæderal Government. And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of Legislation, and will sometimes demand particular Legislative sanction and coöperation. Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect, by a practical attention to the subject, during the period of actual service in the Legislature.

There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the Representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but their reëlection is considered by the Legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the Representatives by the People would not be governed by the same principle.

A few of the members, as happens in all such assem-

blies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent reëlections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members, the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections, even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one Legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the Fæderal Legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each House is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.

All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public, as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the People.

PUBLIUS. .

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives, relates to the apportionment of its members to the several States, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.

It is not contended, that the number of People in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the People of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the apportionment of taxes will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the People, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least exceptionable among the practicable rules; and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the Convention.

All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said: but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought, therefore, to be comprehended in estimates of taxation,

which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation, which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.

“We subscribe to the doctrine,” might one of our Southern brethren observe, “that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities : being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master ; in being vendible by one master to another master ; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another,—the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty ; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others,—the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation ; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The Fæderal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live ; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper

“ criterion ; because it is only under the pretext that the
“ laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of
“ property, that a place is disputed them in the compu-
“ tation of numbers ; and it is admitted, that if the laws
“ were to restore the rights which have been taken away,
“ the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share
“ of Representation with the other inhabitants.

“ This question may be placed in another light. It
“ is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale
“ of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper
“ scale of Representation. Would the Convention have
“ been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected
“ the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares
“ of Representation were to be calculated, and inserted
“ them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was
“ to be adjusted ? Could it be reasonably expected,
“ that the Southern States would concur in a system,
“ which considered their slaves in some degree as men,
“ when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to con-
“ sider them in the same light, when advantages were
“ to be conferred ? Might not some surprise also be
“ expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States
“ with the barbarous policy of considering as property
“ a part of their human brethren, should themselves
“ contend, that the Government to which all the States
“ are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate
“ race more completely in the unnatural light of property,
“ than the very laws of which they complain ?

“ It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not includ-
“ ed in the estimate of Representatives in any of the
“ States possessing them. They neither vote themselves,
“ nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what
“ principle, then, ought they to be taken into the Fæd-
“ eral estimate of representation ? In rejecting them
“ altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect,
“ have followed the very laws which have been appealed
“ to, as the proper guide.

“ This objection is repelled by a single observation.
 “ It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Consti-
 “ tution, that as the aggregate number of Representatives
 “ allotted to the several States is to be determined by
 “ a Fæderal rule, founded on the aggregate number of
 “ inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted
 “ number in each State, is to be exercised by such part
 “ of the inhabitants, as the State itself may designate.
 “ The qualifications on which the right of suffrage
 “ depend, are not perhaps the same in any two States.
 “ In some of the States, the difference is very material.
 “ In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are
 “ deprived of this right by the Constitution of the State,
 “ who will be included in the census by which the Fæd-
 “ eral Constitution apportions the Representatives. In
 “ this point of view, the Southern States might retort
 “ the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down
 “ by the Convention required that no regard should be
 “ had to the policy of particular States towards their
 “ own inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves,
 “ as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the
 “ census according to their full number, in like manner
 “ with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other
 “ States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens.
 “ A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is
 “ waived by those who would be gainers by it. All
 “ that they ask is, that equal moderation be shown on
 “ the other side. Let the case of the slaves be consid-
 “ ered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the com-
 “ promising expedient of the Constitution be mutually
 “ adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as
 “ debased by servitude below the equal level of free
 “ inhabitants; which regards the *slave* as divested of
 “ two fifths of the *man*.

“ After all, may not another ground be taken on which
 “ this Article of the Constitution will admit of a still

“ more ready defence? We have hitherto proceeded
“ on the idea, that representation related to persons
“ only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea?
“ Government is instituted no less for protection of
“ the property, than of the persons, of individuals.
“ The one as well as the other, therefore, may be con-
“ sidered as represented by those who are charged with
“ the Government. Upon this principle it is, that in
“ several of the States, and particularly in the State
“ of New York, one branch of the Government is in-
“ tended more especially to be the guardian of property,
“ and is accordingly elected by that part of the society
“ which is most interested in this object of Government.
“ In the Fæderal Constitution, this policy does not pre-
“ vail. The rights of property are committed into the
“ same hands, with the personal rights. Some attention
“ ought, therefore, to be paid to property, in the choice
“ of those hands.

“ For another reason, the votes allowed in the Fæd-
“ eral Legislature to the People of each State, ought
“ to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth
“ of the States. States have not, like individuals, an
“ influence over each other, arising from superior advan-
“ tages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen
“ but a single vote in the choice of his Representative,
“ the respect and consequence which he derives from
“ his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes
“ of others to the objects of his choice; and through this
“ imperceptible channel, the rights of property are con-
“ veyed into the public representation. A State pos-
“ sesses no such influence over other States. It is not
“ probable, that the richest State in the Confederacy
“ will ever influence the choice of a single Representa-
“ tive, in any other State. Nor will the Representatives
“ of the larger and richer States possess any other
“ advantage in the Fæderal Legislature, over the Repre-

“sentatives of other States, than what may result from
“their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their
“superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them
“to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by
“a superior share of representation. The new Consti-
“tution is, in this respect, materially different from the
“existing Confederation, as well as from that of the
“United Netherlands, and other similar Confederacies.
“In each of the latter, the efficacy of the Fæderal res-
“olutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary
“resolutions of the States composing the Union. Hence
“the States, though possessing an equal vote in the
“public councils, have an unequal influence, correspond-
“ing with the unequal importance of these subsequent
“and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Consti-
“tution, the Fæderal Acts will take effect without the
“necessary intervention of the individual States. They
“will depend merely on the majority of votes in the
“Fæderal Legislature; and consequently each vote,
“whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State,
“or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have
“an equal weight and efficacy; in the same manner
“as the votes individually given in a State Legislature,
“by the Representatives of unequal counties or other dis-
“tricts, have each a precise equality of value and effect;
“or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds
“from the difference in the personal character of the
“individual Representative, rather than from any regard
“to the extent of the district from which he comes.”

Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet on the whole, I must confess, that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the Convention have established.

In one respect, the establishment of a common meas-

ure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree, on the disposition, if not on the coöperation of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, February 15, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LIV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another, and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of the Fæderal Legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any Article indeed in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character, and the apparent force of argument, with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of Representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citi-

zens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few, on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the People, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the Representatives.

In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution, than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative Legislature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether we compare their Legislative Assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing over the difference between the smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one Representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and four hundred, a very considerable difference is observable among States nearly equal in population. The number of Representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the number of Representatives. As great a disparity prevails between the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the Representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents, than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to the Constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of the other States.

Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the Representatives and the People ought not to be the same, where the latter are very numerous, as where they are very few. Were the Representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island they would, at this time, amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the representative Assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious, than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power, than six or seven. But it does not follow, that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depository. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases, a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion; and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian Assembly would still have been a mob.

It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State Legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safety might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power

of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.

With these general ideas in our minds, let us weigh the objections which have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power.

The number of which this branch of the Legislature is to consist, at the outset of the Government, will be sixty-five. Within three years a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years, the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture, that the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of Representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted, that the population of the United States will, by that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of Representatives will amount to two hundred; and of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number, which I presume will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted here, what I shall, in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show, that the number of Representatives will be augmented, from time to time, in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed.

The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred, or two hundred,

for a few more, be a safe depository for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question, without first obliterating every impression which I have received, with regard to the present genius of the People of America, the spirit which actuates the State Legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens. I am unable to conceive, that the People of America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year repeat the choice, of sixty-five or an hundred men, who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to conceive that the State Legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting the Fæderal Legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents. I am equally unable to conceive, that there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five or an hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the People at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What change of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our country, may produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us, and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must pronounce, that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the Fæderal Constitution.

From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our Fæderal rulers, and enable them to ensnare

and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a free and independent Nation? The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution were a less numerous body than their successors will be: they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their fellow-citizens at large: though appointed from year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years, and, prior to the ratification of the Fæderal Articles, for a still longer term: they held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy: they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations: through the whole course of the war, they had the fate of their country more in their hands, than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future Representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed, that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled: yet we know by happy experience, that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.

Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the Fæderal Government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more than suffice for very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. The only means then which they can possess, will be in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told, that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President, in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The

improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of Government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices, that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members, but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties; and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the People, selected by the People themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust; so there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican Government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 19, 1788.*]

THE FœDERALIST. No. LV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE *second* charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents.

As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of Representatives, with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view, at the same time, the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other Legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.

It is a sound and important principle, that the Representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further, than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the Representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.

What are to be the objects of Fœderal Legislation? Those which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia.

A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked ; but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few Representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the Fœderal councils.

Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interest in either, which will not be within the knowledge of the Representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the State, framed by Representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject, which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the Fœderal Legislature, than to review the different laws, and reduce them in one general Act. A skilful individual in his closet, with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole Union, without any aid from oral information ; and it may be expected, that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of Fœderal Legislation, by the assistance of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment, that this or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having

and exercising within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of the General Legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it?

The Fæderal councils will derive great advantage from another circumstance. The Representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State Legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the Legislature of the United States.

The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same State.

The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of Representatives, does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the Representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and

affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of Fœderal Legislation, with all of which the Fœderal Representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few Representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every Representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other States. The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the contrary. At present, some of the States are little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry, which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a Nation. These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population; and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of the Convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the Government.

The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The Representatives of these eight mil-

lions in the House of Commons, amount to five hundred and fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons.* It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the People at large, can add anything either to the security of the People against the Government, or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the Legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the Executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real Representatives of the Nation. We will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only, will be the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions; that is to say, there will be one Representative only, to maintain the rights, and explain the situation, *of twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy* constituents, in an Assembly exposed to the whole force of Executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of Legislation within a Nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the Legislature concerning the circumstances of the People. Allowing to this case

* BURGH'S *Political Disquisitions*. — *Publius*.

the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance, that a Representative for every *thirty thousand inhabitants*, will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 19, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LVI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

THE *third* charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandizement of the few.

Of all the objections which have been framed against the Fæderal Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root of republican Government.

The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and, in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers, is the characteristic policy of republican Government. The means relied on in this form of Government for preventing their de-

generacy, are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments, as will maintain a proper responsibility to the People.

Let me now ask, what circumstance there is in the Constitution of the House of Representatives, that violates the principles of republican Government, or favors the elevation of the few, on the ruins of the many? Let me ask, whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly conformable to these principles; and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens?

Who are to be the electors of the Fæderal Representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the People of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the correspondent branch of the Legislature of the State.

Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the People.

If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents.

In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume, that in general they will be somewhat distinguished, also, by those qualities which entitle them to

it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engagements.

In the second place, they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed, that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires, is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.

In the third place, those ties which bind the Representative to his constituents, are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of Government which favors his pretensions, and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring characters, it must generally happen, that a great proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their influence with the People, would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the Government subversive of the authority of the People.

All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the House of Representatives is so constituted, as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the People. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exer-

cise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised ; there forever to remain, unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.

I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the People together. It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few Governments have furnished examples ; but without which every Government degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society, I answer, the genius of the whole system ; the nature of just and constitutional laws ; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the People of America : a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it.

If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the Legislature, as well as on the People, the People will be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty.

Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the People. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that Government will admit, and that human prudence can devise ? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means, by which Re-

publican Government provides for the liberty and happiness of the People? Are they not the identical means on which every State Government in the Union relies for the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to understand by the objection which this paper has combated? What are we to say to the men who profess the most flaming zeal for Republican Government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the People to choose their own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them?

Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of Representatives, he could suppose nothing less, than that some unreasonable qualification of property was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of eligibility was limited to persons of particular families or fortunes; or at least that the mode prescribed by the State Constitutions was, in some respect or other, very grossly departed from. We have seen, how far such a supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference discoverable between the two cases is, that each Representative of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst in the individual States, the election of a Representative is left to about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended, that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment to the State Governments, and an abhorrence to the Fæderal Government? If this be the point on which the objection turns, it deserves to be examined.

Is it supported by *reason*? This cannot be said, without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit Representative, or

more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that as in so great a number a fit Representative would be most likely to be found, so the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him, by the intrigues of the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.

Is the *consequence* from this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right of suffrage, must we not deprive the People of the immediate choice of their public servants, in every instance, where the administration of the Government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for that number of citizens?

Is the doctrine warranted by *facts*? It was shown in the last paper, that the real representation in the British House of Commons very little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful causes, not existing here, and which favor in that country the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is eligible as a Representative of a county, unless he possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year; nor of a city or borough, unless he possess a like estate of half that annual value. To this qualification, on the part of the county Representatives, is added another on the part of the county electors, which restrains the right of suffrage to persons having a freehold estate of the annual value of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to the present rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances, and notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be said, that the Representatives of the Nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many.

But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own is explicit and decisive. The districts in New Hampshire, in which the Senators are

chosen immediately by the People, are nearly as large as will be necessary for her Representatives in the Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose; and those of New York still more so. In the last State, the Members of Assembly, for the cities and counties of New York and Albany, are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a Representative in the Congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five Representatives only. It makes no difference, that in these Senatorial districts and counties, a number of Representatives are voted for by each elector, at the same time. If the same electors, at the same time, are capable of choosing four or five Representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing one. Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of her counties, which elect her State Representatives, are almost as large as her districts will be by which her Fœderal Representatives will be elected. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will, therefore, form nearly two districts for the choice of Fœderal Representatives. It forms, however, but one county, in which every elector votes for each of its Representatives in the State Legislature. And what may appear to be still more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually elects a *single member* for the Executive Council. This is the case in all the other counties of the State.

Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has been employed against the branch of the Fœderal Government under consideration? Has it appeared on trial, that the Senators of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, or the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, or the members of the Assembly in the two last States, have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few; or are in any respect less worthy of their places, than the Representa-

tives and magistrates appointed in other States, by very small divisions of the People?

But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet quoted. One branch of the Legislature of Connecticut is so constituted, that each member of it is elected by the whole State. So is the Governor of that State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the President of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive mode of choosing Representatives of the People tends to elevate traitors and to undermine the public liberty.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LVII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand.

It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show, that like most other objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject; or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld.

1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected, that the Fæderal Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State Constitutions, in the

security provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of Representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first instance, is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of three years. Within every successive term of ten years, a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of Representatives to the number of inhabitants; under the single exception, that each State shall have one Representative at least: Secondly, to augment the number of Representatives at the same periods; under the sole limitation, that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the Constitutions of the several States, we shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject; that others correspond pretty much on this point with the Fœderal Constitutions; and that the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision.

2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of Representatives under the State Constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the constituents; and it appears that the former have been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for them.

3. There is a peculiarity in the Fœderal Constitution, which insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the People and of their Representatives, to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the Legislature is a representation of citizens; the other of the States: in the former, consequently, the larger States will have most weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States. From this circumstance it may with certainty be inferred, that the larger States will be strenuous ad-

vocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the Legislature in which their influence predominates. And it so happens, that four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole votes in the House of Representatives. Should the Representatives or People, therefore, of the smaller States, oppose at any time a reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition, which, notwithstanding the rivalry and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution.

It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.

Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two Houses on all Legislative subjects, except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted, that the House, composed of the greater number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the People, will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two Houses.

This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the same side, of being supported in its demands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution;

and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of contending against the force of all these solemn considerations.

It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation between the smallest and largest States, there are several, which, though most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former, are too little removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence, it is by no means certain, that a majority of votes, even in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of Representatives.

It will not be looking too far to add, that the Senators from all the new States may be gained over to the just views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the Representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing to do, but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other; and the Senators from all the most growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which their States will feel in the former.

These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject; and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives can not only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support

of Government. They, in a word, hold the purse; that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the People gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the Government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon, with which any Constitution can arm the immediate Representatives of the People, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.

But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the Senate, in maintaining the Government in its proper functions; and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all cases, the smaller the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the Government. Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger, or of a dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those causes, we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the Government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed to involve every department of the State in the general confusion, has neither been apprehended, nor experienced. The utmost degree

of firmness that can be displayed by the Fæderal Senate or President, will not be more than equal to a resistance, in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.

In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstance of economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of Representatives; and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution, as has been furnished by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the Fæderal service a large number of such characters as the People will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to add on this subject, as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that in all Legislative Assemblies, the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous any Assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendancy of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters of this description, that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the People assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway, as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative Assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the People. Ignorance

will be the dupe of cunning; and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The People can never err more than in supposing, that by multiplying their Representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the Government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them, that on the contrary, *after securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society*, they will counteract their own views, by every addition to their Representatives. The countenance of the Government may become more democratic; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged; but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.

As connected with the objection against the number of Representatives, may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the number made competent for Legislative business. It has been said, that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free Government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable

indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular Government; a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of popular Governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among us.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LVIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the National Legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members.

It is in these words: “The *times, places, and manner* of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter *such regulations*, except as to the *places* of choosing Senators.”* This provision has not only been declaimed against by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross; but it has been censured by those who have objected with less latitude, and greater moderation; and, in one instance, it has been thought exceptionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of the system.

I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be

* 1st Clause, 4th Section of the 1st Article. — *Publius*.

any Article in the whole plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that *every Government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation*. Every just reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in the work of the Convention; and will disapprove every deviation from it, which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the work some particular ingredient, with which a rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a portion of imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness, and perhaps anarchy.

It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and inserted in the Constitution, which would have been always applicable to every probable change in the situation of the country; and it will, therefore, not be denied, that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded, that there were only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and disposed; that it must either have been lodged wholly in the National Legislature, or wholly in the State Legislatures, or primarily in the latter, and ultimately in the former. The last mode has, with reason, been preferred by the Convention. They have submitted the regulation of elections for the Fæderal Government, in the first instance, to the local administrations; which, in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more satisfactory; but they have reserved to the National authority a right to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety.

Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive

power of regulating elections for the National Government, in the hands of the State Legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, without an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy, can never be dignified with that character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State Governments, as on the part of the General Government. And as it is more consonant to the rules of a just theory, to intrust the Union with the care of its own existence, than to transfer that care to any other hands, if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on the other, it is more rational to hazard them where the power would naturally be placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed.

Suppose an Article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State Governments? The violation of principle, in this case, would have required no comment; and, to an unbiased observer, it will not be less apparent in the project of subjecting the existence of the National Government, in a similar respect, to the pleasure of the State Governments. An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction, that each, as far as possible, ought to depend on itself for its own preservation.

As an objection to this position, it may be remarked, that the constitution of the National Senate would involve, in its full extent, the danger which it is suggested might flow from an exclusive power in the State Legislatures to regulate the Fæderal elections. It may be alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators, they might at any time give a fatal blow to the Union; and from this it may be inferred, that as its existence would be thus rendered dependent upon them in so essential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting them with it, in the particular case under consideration. The interest of each State, it may be added, to maintain its representation in the National Councils, would be a complete security against an abuse of the trust.

This argument, though specious, will not, upon examination, be found solid. It is certainly true, that the State Legislatures, by forbearing the appointment of Senators, may destroy the National Government. But it will not follow, that because they have the power to do this in one instance, they ought to have it in every other. There are cases in which the pernicious tendency of such a power may be far more decisive, without any motive equally cogent with that which must have regulated the conduct of the Convention in respect to the formation of the Senate, to recommend their admission into the system. So far as that construction may expose the Union to the possibility of injury from the State Legislatures, it is an evil; but it is an evil which could not have been avoided without excluding the States, in their political capacities, wholly from a place in the organization of the National Government. If this had been done, it would doubtless have been interpreted into an entire dereliction of the Fæderal principle; and would certainly have deprived the State Governments of that absolute safeguard, which they will enjoy under this provision. But however wise it may

have been, to have submitted in this instance to an inconvenience, for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good, no inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity urges, nor any greater good invites.

It may be easily discerned, also that the National Government would run a much greater risk, from a power in the State Legislatures over the elections of its House of Representatives, than from their power of appointing the members of its Senate. The Senators are to be chosen for the period of six years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years; and no State is to be entitled to more than two Senators; a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result of these circumstances would be, that a temporary combination of a few States, to intermit the appointment of Senators, could neither annul the existence, nor impair the activity of the body; and it is not from a general and permanent combination of the States, that we can have anything to fear. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State Legislatures: the last would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the People; which will, either never exist at all, or will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the General Government to the advancement of their happiness; in which event, no good citizen could desire its continuance.

But with regard to the Fæderal House of Representatives, there is intended to be a general election of members once in two years. If the State Legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating these elections, every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the National situation; which might issue in a dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of

the most important States should have entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election.

I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in the observation, that the interest of each State, to be represented in the Fæderal Councils, will be a security against the abuse of a power over its elections in the hands of the State Legislatures. But the security will not be considered as complete, by those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest of the People in the public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. The People of America may be warmly attached to the Government of the Union, at times when the particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement, and supported by a stong faction in each of those States, may be in a very opposite temper. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of the People, and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils, is exemplified in some of the States at the present moment, on the present question. The scheme of separate Confederacies, which will always multiply the chances of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all such influential characters in the State administrations, as are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the National Government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most considerable States, where the temptation will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the People, (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited,) to discontinue the choice of members for the Fæderal House of Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm

Union of this country, under an efficient Government, will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. Its preservation therefore ought in no case, that can be avoided, to be committed to the guardianship of any but those, whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.*]

THE FœDERALIST. No. LIX.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

WE have seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections for the Fœderal Government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State Legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side: that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the

one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition, which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the National Councils; and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.

The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the People, headed and directed by the State Governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, by the deliberate policy of the Government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and incredible.

In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the National Government, and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views, in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the People of the different parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their Representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same Government will promote a gradual assimilation,

in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the Government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the People, the Senate by the State Legislatures, the President by Electors chosen for that purpose by the People, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.

As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time and manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the National Government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State Legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us, that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have, to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the Legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary coöperation of the State Legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed, whether in their hands, or in those of the Union.

But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the National Councils? Is it to be exercised in a

discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of "the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?

If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the National Councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local Councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former, than from the latter.

The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire; and in most of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the National representation; and for the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.

In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the Government. As long as this interest prevails in

most of the State Legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the National Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those Assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the Fæderal Legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their own principles, suspect, that the State Legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same situation must have the same effect, in the primitive composition at least of the Fæderal House of Representatives, an improper bias towards the mercantile class, is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other.

In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the National Government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the Fæderal administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood, that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the Councils of the Union, than in those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And, thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity, upon a large scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined

to inflict upon it so deep a wound, as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest, from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity.

I the rather consult brevity, in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of "the wealthy and the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious præminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body; at another time, it is to be effected by depriving the People at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.

But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them, a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot, or that of their predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,*) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of

* Particularly in the Southern States and in this State. — *Publius*.

elections to particular districts, would be as subversive of its own aim, as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect, or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the National Government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the *times*, the *places*, and the *manner* of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose, or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the Legislature.

Let it however be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted, that all the scruples which a sense of duty, or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the National rulers; still I imagine, it will hardly be pretended, that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution, without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the People. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object, has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment, that such a force might exist; and the National Government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of

men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the dismissal, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear, that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remotest extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the People?

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LX.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the Convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the danger appre-

hended; and the want of it will never be considered, by an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable objection to the plan. The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the National rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.

If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State Constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the National Government in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that review would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State in which I write. The Constitution of New York makes no other provision for *locality* of elections, than that the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the *counties*; those of the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided: these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be perceived, that it would not be more difficult to the Legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the Legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become

the only electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine, that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the county of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, &c., or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate sooner than they would repair to the city of New York to participate in the choice of the members of the Fœderal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is at an *inconvenient distance* from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same, whether that distance be twenty miles, or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular modification of the Fœderal power of regulating elections, will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the Constitution of this State; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion, in respect to the Constitutions of most of the other States.

If it should be said, that defects in the State Constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is, that they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as

innocent omissions in the State Constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the Convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the Representatives of the People, in a single State, should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or other sinister motives, than the Representatives of the People of the United States? If they cannot do this, they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of People, with the advantage of local Governments to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand People who are destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction in a single State, should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the Representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests.

Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage, which will result from this disposition, and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity, in the time of elections for the Fæderal House of Representatives. It is more than possible, that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare; both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If

each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be, at least, as many different periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in the several States, as they are now established for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be, that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same; assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example, which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think, that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations.

Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for conveniently assembling the Legislature at a stated period in each year.

It may be asked, Why then could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the Convention in this State, are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the Constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the Constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be intrusted to Legislative discretion; and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added

that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish, as a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own Governments, and for the National Government, at the same epochs.

PUBLIUS.

For the Independent Journal.

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate.

The heads into which this member of the Government may be considered, are, I. The qualifications of Senators; II. The appointment of them by the State Legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of Senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.

I. The qualifications proposed for Senators, as distinguished from those of Representatives, consist in a more advanced age, and a longer period of citizenship. A Senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a Representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the Senatorial trust;

which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires, at the same time, that the Senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the National Councils.

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of Senators by the State Legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the Government, that which has been proposed by the Convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State Governments such an agency in the formation of the Fæderal Government, as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a People thoroughly incorporated into one Nation, every district ought to have a *proportional* share in the Government; and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an *equal* share in the common councils; it does not appear to be without some reason,

that in a compound republic, partaking both of the National and Fæderal character, the Government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual "deference and concession which the peculiarity of our "political situation rendered indispensable." A common Government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America. A Government, founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former, lies between the proposed Government, and a Government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be, to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice.

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the People, and,

then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may, in some instances, be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defence which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our Governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice, than it appears to many in contemplation.

IV. The number of Senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a Senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution.

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican Government, though in a less degree than to other Governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a Senate, as a second branch of the Legislative Assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the Government. It doubles the security to the People, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in

the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican Government.

Secondly. The necessity of a Senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked, is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity, ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.

Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a Senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our Governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the

hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the People, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted Senate?

A good Government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of Government, which is the happiness of the People; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some Governments are deficient in both these qualities; most Governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American Governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The Fæderal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.

Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the Government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the Representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in National transactions.

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable Government, would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.

In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with National character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another, what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs.

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the People, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the People. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things, in which it may be said, with some truth, that laws are made for the *few*, not for the *many*.

In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable Government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce, when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant Government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward, which requires the auspices of a steady system of National policy.

But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence, which steals into the hearts of the People, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No Government, any more than an individual, will long be respected, without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.

PUBLIUS.

For the Independent Journal.

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

A *FIFTH* desideratum, illustrating the utility of a Senate, is the want of a due sense of National character. Without a select and stable member of the Government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the National Councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain its respect and confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every Government, for two reasons: the one is, that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the National Councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind.

Yet however requisite a sense of National character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently

possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly Representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to National character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided People is now laboring.

I add, as a *sixth* defect, the want, in some important cases, of a due responsibility in the Government to the People, arising from that frequency of elections, which in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of Government may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no

explanation. And yet it is evident, that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the People to estimate the *share* of influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a *numerous* body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the Legislative department, which having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate, only as they relate to the Representatives of the People. To a People as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the People against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all Governments, and actually will, in all free Governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers: so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the People, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of

interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the People against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the People of Athens have often escaped, if their Government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next.

It may be suggested, that a People spread over an extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation, which will exempt the People of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among them.

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic, which had not a Senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only States to whom that

character can be applied. In each of the two first, there was a Senate for life. The constitution of the Senate in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable, that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller Council, drawn out of the Senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular Governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a Senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the People, and to the People themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an institution. The People can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the Representatives of the People; and the danger will be evidently greater, where the whole Legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public Act.

The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of representation; which is the pivot on which the former move,

and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown, that I am disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient Governments on the subject of representation, is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the Executive functions were performed, not by the People themselves, but by officers elected by the People, and *representing* the People in their *Executive* capacity.

Prior to the reform of SOLON, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually *elected by the People at large*. The degree of power delegated to them, seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an Assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually *elected by the People*; and *partially* representing them in their *Legislative* capacity, since they were not only associated with the People in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating Legislative propositions to the People. The Senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been *elective* by the suffrages of the People. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular Governments of antiquity.

Lastly, in Sparta, we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in number, but annually *elected by the whole body of the People*, and considered as the *Representatives* of the People, almost in their *plenipotentiary* capacity. The

Cosmi of Crete were also annually *elected by the People*; and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the People.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political Constitutions. The true distinction between these and the American Governments, lies *in the total exclusion of the People, in their collective capacity*, from any share in the *latter*, and not in the *total exclusion of the Representatives of the People* from the administration of the *former*. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative Government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a Senate appointed not immediately by the People, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous preëminence in the Government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, is apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State Legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt the People at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted, before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State Legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coequal branch of the Government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the People themselves, a succession of new Representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself, that the proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions?

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by experience. The Constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the Fæderal Senate will be, indirectly by the People, and for a term less by one year only than the Fæderal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment; and at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the Fæderal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the Fæderal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate

of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the Fæderal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland Constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the Union.

But if anything could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary Assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the People, is elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the People. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the Anti-Fæderal argument, the British history informs us that this hereditary Assembly has not even been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual Representatives of the People, were found an overmatch for the Senate for life; continually gained on its authority; and finally drew all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the Representatives of the People, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the Senate

for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free Government, which has the People on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose Senate, according to the testimony of POLYBIUS, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the whole of its original portion.

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, that the Fœderal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independant and aristocratic body, we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives, with the People on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate Representatives of the People, nothing will be able to maintain even the Constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the Legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the People themselves.

PUBLIUS.

[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788.]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

IT is a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable Articles in it.

The second Section gives power to the President, "*by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties*, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."

The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. The Convention appears to have been attentive to both these points; they have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of Electors, to be deputed by the People for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of Senators to the State Legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the People in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often

places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the Electors.

As the select Assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State Legislatures who appoint the Senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume, that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the People perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the Electors to men of whom the People have had time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise Kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an Assembly of select Electors possess, in a greater degree than Kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the President and Senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our National interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign Nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged.

Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high importance of it in National affairs,

has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to recollect, that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures, which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the Convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our National concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has the Convention discovered less prudence, in providing for the frequent elections of Senators in such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information, will be preserved.

There are few who will not admit, that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully maintained; and they who assent to the truth of this position will see and confess, that it is well provided for by mak-

ing concurrence of the Senate necessary, both to treaties and to laws.

It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect *secrecy* and immediate *despatch* are sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons, whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The Convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.

They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in National affairs, is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours are precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a Prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either, should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore

suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are no otherwise important in a National view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negociation. For these, the President will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see, that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch, on the other.

But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, objections are contrived and urged.

Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with Legislative authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given by our Governor, are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our Legislature. All Constitutional acts of power, whether in the Executive or in the Judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the Legislature; and therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the People may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judicial. It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the Legis-

lature, that therefore they should likewise give them power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected.

Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the *supreme* laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties, like Acts of Assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country; but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect, that a treaty is only another name for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a Nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them *absolutely*, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them: but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of Legislative Acts now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form of Government.

However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States. Others suspect, that two thirds will oppress the remaining

third, and ask, whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties?

As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a National form, and a National character, so will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention; and the Government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget, that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties, by which they, and their families and estates, will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and having no private interests distinct from that of the Nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter.

As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions, who can think it probable, that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross, and too invidious, to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of Nations.

With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased. Every considera-

tion that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded, that the treaties they make will be as advantageous, as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the Article on the subject of impeachments.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXIV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE remaining powers which the plan of the Convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the Executive in the appointment to offices, and in their Judicial character as a Court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments, the Executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will therefore conclude this head, with a view of the Judicial character of the Senate.

A well-constituted Court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired, than difficult to be obtained in a Government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other

words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated *POLITICAL*, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly, or inimical, to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the preëxisting factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases, there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a Government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders, or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

The Convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion; and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have produced it.

What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of *NATIONAL INQUEST* into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the in-

quisitors for the Nation as the Representatives of the Nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry, or in other words, of preferring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the Legislative body: will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement, strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry? The model, from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed, pointed out that course to the Convention. In Great Britain, it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment; and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State Constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments, as a bridle in the hands of the Legislative body upon the Executive servants of the Government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?

Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel *confidence enough in its own situation*, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an *individual* accused, and the *Representatives of the People, his accusers*?

Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the People to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their immediate Representatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to

the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous Court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offence by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the Judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of Courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the Judges, who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a Court of Impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.

These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a Court of Impeachments. There remains a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this:—The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen, in one trial, should, in another trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of error in the second sentence?

That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature, will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the same persons Judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismissal from a present, and disqualification for a future office. It may be said, that the intervention of a Jury, in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But Juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of Judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the Court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a Jury acting under the auspices of Judges who had predetermined his guilt?

Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have united the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the Court of Impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same Judges in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the President of the Court of Impeachments, as is proposed to be done in the plan of the Convention; while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean I forbear to remark upon

the additional pretext for clamor against the Judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded.

Would it have been desirable to have composed the Court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the Government? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in favor of such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the Government, the utility of which would at best be questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this: a Court formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of Government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State Governments, to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different, which could rationally be proposed. As the Court, for reasons already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man, who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them; the second will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union; the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated determination of the charges which might be brought against them; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption; and in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate

or designing majority in the House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh, and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at certain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies of men.

But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined, or some other that might be devised, should be thought preferable to the plan, in this respect, reported by the Convention, it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of Government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found? Who will undertake to unite the discordant opinions of a whole community, in the same judgment of it; and to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his *infallible* criterion for the *fallible* criterion of his more *conceited neighbor*? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious.

PUBLIUS.

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.]

THE FœDERALIST. No. LXV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed Court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter.

The *first* of these objections is, that the provision in question confounds Legislative and Judiciary authorities in the same body, in violation of that important and well-established maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some cases, not only proper, but necessary to the mutual defence of the several members of the Government against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the Executive upon the acts of the Legislative body, is admitted by the ablest adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that the powers relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the Executive. The division of them between the two branches of the Legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the

right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and Judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.

It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to admire, without exception, the Constitution of this State; while that Constitution makes the Senate, together with the Chancellor and Judges of the Supreme Court, not only a Court of Impeachments, but the highest Judicatory in the State, in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of numbers, of the Chancellor and Judges to the Senators, is so inconsiderable, that the Judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the Convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much more culpable must be the Constitution of New York?*

A *second* objection to the Senate, as a Court of Impeachments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the Government a countenance too aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of

* In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the Legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, one branch of the Legislature is the Court for the trial of impeachments.—*Publius*.

impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to decide, on general principles, where it may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience?

If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the Convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated in a former number, and by others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving, that it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings.

But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the Senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most *popular* branch of every Government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the People, will be as

generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the Government.

But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the equilibrium of the National House of Representatives, the plan of the Convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives. The same House will possess the sole right of instituting impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to that of determining them? The same House will be the umpire in all elections of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number of Electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate, though contingent power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.

A *third* objection to the Senate as a Court of Impeachments, is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent Judges of the conduct of men, in whose official creation they had participated. The principle of this objection would condemn a practice, which is to be seen in all the State Governments, if not in all the Governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would al-

ways be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that the responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it all such, who, by their conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them. Though facts may not always correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive, should feel a bias, towards the objects of that choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the Representatives of the Nation to become its accusers.

If any further arguments were necessary to evince the improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments.

It will be the office of the President to *nominate*, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to *appoint*. There will, of course, be no exertion of *choice* on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves *choose* — they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed; because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate

would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy.

A *fourth* objection to the Senate, in the capacity of a Court of Impeachments, is derived from their union with the Executive in the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute the Senators their own Judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the Nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they had been guilty?

This objection has been circulated with more earnestness, and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived, if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation.

The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the Legislatures of the several States, is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the National Councils in this particular. The Convention might with propriety have meditated the punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed to him; they might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption: but

they could not, with more or with equal propriety, have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the National Legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law : a principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any Government. How, in fact, could a majority of the House of Representatives impeach themselves ? Not better, it is evident, than two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. And yet what reason is there, that a majority of the House of Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with impunity, more than two thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power ? The truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom, and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective capacity ; and the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.

So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in perverting the instructions, or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence, or to vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might concern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of human

nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and disgrace.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXVI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE Constitution of the Executive department of the proposed Government, claims next our attention.

There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or criticised with less judgment.

Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the People to monarchy, they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States; not merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny of that detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a magistrate, in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a Governor of New York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a King of Great Brit-

ain. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses, giving audience to the Envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries; and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio.

Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure, or it might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature and form: in order as well to ascertain its true aspect and genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity, and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances which have been so insidiously, as well as industriously, propagated.

In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with moderation, or to treat with seriousness the devices, not less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. They so far exceed the usual, though unjustifiable licenses of party artifice, that even in a disposition the most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon the gross pretence of a similitude between a King of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold that imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition.

In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is *expressly* allotted to the Executives of the individual States. I mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate.

This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen, has been hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party;* and who, upon this false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the fact; and let him, if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage he has offered to the dictates of truth, and to the rules of fair dealing.

The second Clause of the second Section of the second Article empowers the President of the United States "to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other *officers* of the United States, whose appointments are *not* in the Constitution *otherwise provided for*, and *which shall be established by law*." Immediately after this Clause follows another in these words: "The President shall have power to fill up all *vacancies* that may happen *during the recess of the Senate*, by granting commissions which shall *expire at the end of their next session*." It is from this last provision that the pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight attention to the connection of the Clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the deduction is not even colorable.

The first of these two Clauses, it is clear, only provides

* See *Cato*, No. V. — *Publius*.

a mode for appointing such officers, “whose appointments are *not otherwise provided for* in the Constitution, and which *shall be established by law* ;” of course it cannot extend to the appointment of Senators, whose appointments are *otherwise provided for* in the Constitution,* and who are *established by the Constitution*, and will not require a future establishment by law. This position will hardly be contested.

The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons:—*First.* The relation in which that Clause stands to the other, which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other; for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was inadequate. The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate *jointly*, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers, and as vacancies might happen *in their recess*, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, *singly*, to make temporary appointments “during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which should expire at the end of “their next session.” *Secondly.* If this Clause is to be considered as supplementary to the one which precedes, the *vacancies* of which it speaks must be construed to relate to the “officers” described in the preceding one; and this, we have seen, excludes from its description the members of the Senate. *Thirdly.* The time within which the power is to operate, “during the recess of the

* Article 1, Section 3, Clause 1. — *Publius*.

“ Senate,” and the duration of the appointments, “ to the
 “ end of the next session ” of that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision, which, if it had been intended to comprehend Senators, would naturally have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of the State Legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the National Senate, who are to have no concern in those appointments ; and would have extended the duration in office of the temporary Senators to the next session of the Legislature of the State, in whose representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing session of the National Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to make the permanent appointments would, of course, have governed the modification of a power which related to the temporary appointments ; and as the National Senate is the body, whose situation is alone contemplated in the Clause upon which the suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with the President. But *lastly*, the first and second Clauses of the third Section of the first Article, not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but destroy the pretext of misconception. The former provides, that “ the Senate of the United States shall be composed of
 “ two Senators from each State, chosen *by the Legislature thereof* for six years ;” and the latter directs, that, “ if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation
 “ or otherwise, *during the recess of the Legislature of*
 “ ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may make temporary appointments until the *next meeting of the Legislature*, which shall then fill such vacancies.” Here is an express power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State Executives, to fill the casual vacan-

cies in the Senate, by temporary appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition, that the Clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility, must have originated in an intention to deceive the People, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy.

I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practised, to prevent a fair and impartial judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the People. Nor have I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to allow myself in a severity of animadversion, little congenial with the general spirit of these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed Government, whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXVII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of

approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit, that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.* I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.

It was desirable, that the sense of the People should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preëstablished body, but to men chosen by the People for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the Government, as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of *several*, to form an intermediate body of Electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community, with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of *one* who was himself to be the final object of

* Vide *Federal Farmer*. — *Publius*.

the public wishes. And as the Electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the People, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican Government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our Councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the Chief Magistracy of the Union? But the Convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any præexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the People of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No Senator, Representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the Electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the People, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well

as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which, though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.

Another, and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the People themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his reëlection to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the Convention; which is, that the People of each State shall choose a number of persons as Electors, equal to the number of Senators and Representatives of such State in the National Government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the National Government; and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes, will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided, that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates, who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the

requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it, as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters præminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the Executive in every Government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says,

“For forms of Government let fools contest —
“That which is best administered is best —”

yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good Government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.

The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.

The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the Convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the Senator of

any State from his seat as Senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme Executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great, if not with equal force, to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable, that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the Constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the People at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities, and discharge the duties of the President.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.*]

THE FŒDERALIST. No. LXVIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the Convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it.

The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the Executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can

be grounded ; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the King of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the Khan of Tartary, to the man of the seven mountains, or to the Governor of New York.

That magistrate is to be elected for *four* years ; and is to be reëligible as often as the People of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances, there is a total dissimilitude between *him* and a King of Great Britain, who is an *hereditary* monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever ; but there is a close analogy between *him* and a Governor of New York, who is elected for *three* years, and is reëligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider, how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of *four* years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of *three* years for a correspondent office in a single State.

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office ; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the King of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable ; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable ; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a National revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a Governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the Governors of Maryland and Delaware.

The President of the United States is to have power to return a Bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the Legislature, for reconsideration; and the Bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both Houses. The King of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the Acts of the two Houses of Parliament. The disuse of that power for a considerable time past, does not affect the reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the Crown's having found the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two Houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of National agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the Council of Revision of this State, of which the Governor is a constituent part. In this respect, the power of the President would exceed that of the Governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the Chancellor and Judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the Governor of Massachusetts, whose Constitution, as to this Article, seems to have been the original from which the Convention have copied.

The President is to be the "Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, *except in cases of impeachment*; to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both Houses of the Legislature, or either of them, and, in case of

“disagreement between them *with respect to the time of adjournment*, to adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all officers of the United States.” In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally that of the King of Great Britain, and of the Governor of New York. The most material points of difference are these:—*First.* The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the Nation, as by Legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The King of Great Britain, and the Governor of New York, have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this Article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the Monarch, or the Governor. *Secondly.* The President is to be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect, his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy: while that of the British King extends to the *declaring* of war and to the *raising* and *regulating* of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature.* The Governor of New York, on

* A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of TAMONY, has asserted that the King of Great Britain owes his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is immemorial, and was only disputed, “contrary to all reason and precedent,” as BLACKSTONE, vol. 1, page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of CHARLES I.; but by the statute the 13th of CHARLES

II., Chap. 6, it was declared to be in the King alone, for that the sole supreme government and command of the militia within his Majesty’s realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, Kings and Queens of England, and that both or either House of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same. — *Publius.*

the other hand, is by the Constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. But the Constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their Governors to be Commanders-in-Chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective Governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. *Thirdly.* The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, *except those of impeachment.* The Governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of the Governor, in this Article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the Government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If a Governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility, he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps, be a greater temptation to undertake, and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the

measure; and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offence of treason is limited "to levying war upon the United States, and "adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort;" and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds. *Fourthly.* The President can only adjourn the National Legislature, in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. The Governor of New York may also prorogue the Legislature of this State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to very important purposes.

The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. The King of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the Nation, in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description. It has been insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the ratification of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist* of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the Crown in its utmost plenitude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the

* *Vide* BLACKSTONE'S *Commentaries*, vol. 1, p. 257. — *Publius*.

stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to the imagination, that its coöperation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this Parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can only do with the concurrence of a branch of the Legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the Fœderal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the exclusive possession by the Union of that part of the sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important prerogative.

The President is also to be authorized to receive Ambassadors, and other public Ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the Government; and it was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign Minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.

The President is to nominate, and, *with the advice and consent of the Senate*, to appoint Ambassadors and other

public Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The King of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense number of Church preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to that of the British King; nor is it equal to that of the Governor of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the Constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power of appointment is with us lodged in a Council, composed of the Governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. The Governor *claims*, and has frequently *exercised* the right of nomination, and is *entitled* to a casting vote in the appointment. If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. In the National Government, if the Senate should be divided, no appointment could be made: in the Government of New York, if the Council should be divided, the Governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.* If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the National Legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the Governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we

* Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment, that I do not think the claim of the Governor to a right of nomination well founded. Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a Government, till its propriety has been constitu-

tionally questioned. And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all their consequences, we shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion. — *Publius*.

at the same time consider, how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a Council of Appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the National Senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce, that the power of the Chief Magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

Hence it appears, that except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the Article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretence for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the King of Great Britain. But to render the contrast, in this respect, still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.

The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the People for *four* years: the King of Great Britain is a perpetual and *hereditary* Prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace: the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a *qualified* negative upon the Acts of the Legislative body: the other has an *absolute* negative. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the Nation: the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of *declaring* war, and of *raising* and *regulating* fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the Legislature in the formation of treaties: the other is the *sole possessor* of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices: the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no

privileges whatever: the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the Nation: the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction: the other is the supreme head and Governor of the National Church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us, that things so unlike resemble each other? — The same that ought to be given to those who tell us, that a Government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the People, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 18, 1788.*]

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIX.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican Government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of Government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without, at the same time, admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading char-

acter in the definition of good Government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man, the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that Republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose conduct threatened the existence of all Government, as against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the Government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a Government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad Government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients, which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the Convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub-

lican sense are, first, a due dependence on the People; secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles, and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive, and a numerous Legislature. They have, with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the People, and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy, will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch, will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates, of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and coöperation of others, in the capacity of Counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the Constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the Executive authority wholly to single men.* Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an Executive Council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar

* New York has no Council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a Council whom the Governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the Constitution, their resolutions do not bind him. — *Publius*.

objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other Nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches anything, it teaches us not to be enamored of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achæans, on an experiment of two Prætors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the Republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the Military Tribunes, who were at times substituted to the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the State from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which the Republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the State, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the Government between them. The Patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defence of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the Republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot; one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs; the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the Republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research,

attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the Supreme Executive Magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the Government, in the most critical emergencies of the State. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the Magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have

credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free Government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the Legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too, that they may be most pernicious. In the Legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarings of parties in that department of the Government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate, or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the Executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive, which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition,—vigor and expedition; and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the National security, everything would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed, that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed, that is, to a plurality of Magistrates of equal dignity and authority; a scheme, the advocates for which are not

likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a Council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that Council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the Executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds, to censure and to punishment. The first is the most important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine, on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any National miscarriage or misfortune, are sometimes so complicated, that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce, to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

“I was overruled by my Council. The Council were “so divided in their opinions, that it was impossible “to obtain any better resolution on the point.” These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there, that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy is it to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the Governor of this State is coupled with a Council, that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the Governor on the members of the Council; who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination: while the People remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified, and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the People of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power:— *First*, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, *secondly*, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to

their removal from office, or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the King is a perpetual Magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that Kingdom, than to annex to the King a constitutional Council, who may be responsible to the Nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the Executive department, an idea inadmissible in a free Government. But even there, the King is not bound by the resolutions of his Council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office; and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him, at his sole discretion.

But in a Republic, where every Magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the reason, which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a Council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the Chief Magistrate; which serves in some degree as a hostage to the National justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a Council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State Constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend, that the advantage on that side would not counterbal-

ance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the Executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated JUNIUS pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the Executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE;"* that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the People; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,† were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the Council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination, America would have more to fear, than

* DE LOLME. — *Publius*.

† Ten. — *Publius*.

from the ambition of any single individual. A Council to a Magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions; are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad; and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the Council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of Government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add, that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the Executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 18, 1788.*]

THE FŒDERALIST. No. LXX.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

DURATION in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the Executive Magistrate, in the employment of his Constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration, which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to

the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a general principle of human nature that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it; will be less attached to what he holds by a momentary or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a durable or certain title; and, of course, will be willing to risk more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the other. This remark is not less applicable to a political privilege, or honor, or trust, than to any article of ordinary property. The inference from it is, that a man acting in the capacity of Chief Magistrate, under a consciousness that in a very short time he *must* lay down his office, will be apt to feel himself too little interested in it, to hazard any material censure or perplexity, from the independent exertion of his powers, or from encountering the ill-humors, however transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable part of the society itself, or even in a predominant faction in the Legislative body. If the case should only be, that he *might* lay it down, unless continued by a new choice, and if he should be desirous of being continued, his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would tend still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and irresolution must be the characteristics of the station.

There are some, who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current, either in the community, or in the Legislature, as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which Government was instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of the

community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the People may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation, that the People commonly *intend* the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend, that they always *reason right* about the *means* of promoting it. They know from experience, that they sometimes err; and the wonder is, that they so seldom err as they do, beset as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites and sycophants; by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate; by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it; and of those who seek to possess, rather than to deserve it. When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the People are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited, in which a conduct of this kind has saved the People from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.

But however inclined we might be, to insist upon an unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the inclinations of the People, we can with no propriety contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the Legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in opposition to the former; and at other times the People

may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is certainly desirable, that the Executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and decision.

The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition between the various branches of power, teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so contrived as to render the one independent of the other. To what purpose separate the Executive or the Judiciary from the Legislative, if both the Executive and the Judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of the Legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends for which it was established. It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the Legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good Government; and whatever may be the forms of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of the Legislative authority to absorb every other, has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in some preceding numbers. In Governments purely republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The Representatives of the People, in a popular Assembly, seem sometimes to fancy, that they are the People themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the Executive or Judiciary, were a breach of their privilege, and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and as they commonly have the People on their side, they always act with such momentum, as to make it very difficult for the other members of the Government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.

It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in office can affect the independence of the Executive on the Legislature, unless the one were possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the other. One answer to this inquiry may be drawn from the principle already remarked, that is, from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more obvious, though not more conclusive, will result from the consideration of the influence of the Legislative body over the People; which might be employed to prevent the reflection of a man who, by an upright resistance to any sinister project of that body, should have made himself obnoxious to its resentment.

It may be asked also, whether a duration of four years would answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less period, which would at least be recommended by greater security against ambitious designs, would not, for that reason, be preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the Magistrate.

It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any other limited duration, would completely answer the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the Government. Between the commencement and termination of such a period, there would always be a considerable interval, in which the prospect of annihilation would be sufficiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself, that there would be time enough before it

arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue. Though it be probable, that, as he approached the moment when the public were, by a new election, to signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline; yet both the one and the other would derive support from the opportunities which his previous continuance in the station had afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem and good-will of his constituents. He might, then, hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of his fellow-citizens. As on the one hand, a duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition, so on the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty. If a British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings, *from the mere power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax*, have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the Crown and the privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to be compatible with the principles of a free Government, while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the Legislature; if they have been able, in one instance, to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the Church as State; if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make the Monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation* attempted by them; what would be to be feared from an elective Magistrate of four years' duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United

* This was the case with respect and rejected in the House of Lords, to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was to the entire satisfaction, as it is carried in the House of Commons, said, of the People. — *Publius*.

States? What, but that he might be unequal to the task which the Constitution assigns him? I shall only add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jealousy of his encroachments.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, March 21, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXXI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE ADMINISTRATION of Government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps in its most precise signification, it is limited to Executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the Executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the Legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the direction of the operations of war: these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the administration of Government. The persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate; and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence. This view of the subject will at once suggest to us the intimate connection between the

duration of the Executive Magistrate in office, and the stability of the system of administration. To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and in addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of public choice, the person substituted is warranted in supposing, that the dismissal of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to his measures; and that the less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to the favor of his constituents. These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of the Government.

With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of reëligibility. The first is necessary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well, and to the community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits. The last is necessary to enable the People, when they see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue him in the station, in order to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the Government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration.

Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in relation to the present point has had some respectable advocates, — I mean that of continuing the Chief Magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would

have nearly the same effects ; and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary.

One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty, when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of *obtaining*, by *merit-ing*, a continuance of them. This position will not be disputed, so long as it is admitted, that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct ; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind, is to make their interest coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good.

Another ill effect of the exclusion would be the temptation to sordid views, to peculation, and, in some instances, to usurpation. An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not easy to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed, while it lasted ; and might not scruple to have

recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory; though the same man, probably, with a different prospect before him, might content himself with the regular perquisites of his situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of his opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. Add to this, that the same man might be vain or ambitious, as well as avaricious. And if he could expect to prolong his honors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice his appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But with the prospect before him of approaching and inevitable annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, or his ambition.

An ambitious man too, when he found himself seated on the summit of his country's honors, when he looked forward to the time at which he must descend from the exalted eminence forever, and reflected that no exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse: such a man, in such a situation, would be much more violently tempted to embrace a favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power, at every personal hazard, than if he had the probability of answering the same end by doing his duty.

Would it promote the peace of the community, or the stability of the Government, to have half a dozen men who had had credit enough to be raised to the seat of the Supreme Magistracy, wandering among the People like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to possess?

A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the community of the advantage of the experience gained by the Chief Magistrate in the exercise of his office. That experience is the parent of wisdom, is an adage, the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest of mankind. What more desirable

or more essential than this quality in the Governors of Nations? Where more desirable or more essential than in the first Magistrate of a Nation? Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban of the Constitution; and to declare that the moment it is acquired, its possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which it was acquired, and to which it is adapted? This, nevertheless, is the precise import of all those regulations which exclude men from serving their country, by the choice of their fellow-citizens, after they have by a course of service fitted themselves for doing it with a greater degree of utility.

A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be, the banishing men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the State, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety. There is no Nation which has not, at one period or another, experienced an absolute necessity of the services of particular men, in particular situations, perhaps it would not be too strong to say, to the preservation of its political existence. How unwise, therefore, must be every such self-denying ordinance, as serves to prohibit a Nation from making use of its own citizens, in the manner best suited to its exigencies and circumstances! Without supposing the personal essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change of the Chief Magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another, even of equal merit, would at all times be detrimental to the community, inasmuch as it would substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and set afloat the already settled train of the administration.

A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration. By *necessitating* a change of men, in the first office of the Nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures. It is not generally to be

expected, that men will vary, and measures remain uniform. The contrary is the usual course of things. And we need not be apprehensive that there will be too much stability, while there is even the option of changing; nor need we desire to prohibit the People from continuing their confidence where they think it may be safely placed, and where, by constancy on their part, they may obviate the fatal inconveniencies of fluctuating councils and a variable policy.

These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the principle of exclusion. They apply most forcibly to the scheme of a perpetual exclusion; but when we consider, that even a partial exclusion would always render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious object, the observations which have been made will apply nearly as fully to one case as to the other.

What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st. Greater independence in the Magistrate; 2d, Greater security to the People. Unless the exclusion be perpetual, there will be no pretence to infer the first advantage. But even in that case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his independence? May he have no connections, no friends, for whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing, by a firm conduct, to make personal enemies, when he acts under the impression, that a time is fast approaching, on the arrival of which he not only *MAY*, but must be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps upon an inferior footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether his independence would be most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement.

As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. If the exclusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any case to

entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post, in which his passion for power and præminence had acquired the force of habit. And if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of the People, he might induce them to consider as a very odious and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a provision which was calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a favorite. There may be conceived circumstances in which this disgust of the People, seconding the thwarted ambition of such a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional privilege.

There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the People to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, March 21, 1788.*]

THE FœDERALIST. No. LXXII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the Executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident, that without proper attention to this Article, the separation of the Executive from

the Legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The Legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will, as they might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all the latitude of the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended. There are men who could neither be distressed, nor won, into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found, that a power over a man's support is a power over his will. If it were necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the Executive by the terrors, or allurements, of the pecuniary arrangements of the Legislative body.

It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. It is there provided, that "The President of the United States shall, at stated times, receive for his service a compensation *which shall neither be increased, nor diminished, during the period for which he shall have been elected*; and he *shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.*" It is impossible to imagine any provision which would have been more eligible than this. The Legislature, on the appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what shall be the compensation for his services during the time for which he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no power to alter it, either by increase or diminution, till a new period of service by a new election commences. They can neither weaken his fortitude by operating upon his necessities, nor corrupt his in-

tegrity by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, nor any of its members, will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any other emolument than that which may have been determined by the first act. He can of course have no pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him by the Constitution.

The last of the requisites to energy, which have been enumerated, are competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to be vested in the President of the United States.

The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the qualified negative of the President upon the Acts or Resolutions of the two Houses of the Legislature; or, in other words, his power of returning all Bills with objections; to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the component members of the Legislative body.

The propensity of the Legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles, results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive, upon the Acts of the Legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive Resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the Legislative and Executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same

hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the Legislative body, to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not to be left at the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence.

But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enactment of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the Legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.

The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been combated by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this presumption should be entertained, it would be improper to give the Executive Magistrate any species of control over the Legislative body.

But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive; but upon the supposition, that the Legislative will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of the other members of the Government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflection, would condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of

the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest. It is far less probable, that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the Government at the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them.

It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our Governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they may happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of Legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.

Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the Legislative body in a free Government, and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great caution; and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A King of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes,

and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the Joint Resolutions of the two Houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the displeasure of the Nation, by an opposition to the sense of the Legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his prerogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that Kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the Crown has been exercised.

If a Magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period of four years, with the Executive authority of a Government wholly and purely republican?

It is evident, that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency, has been drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defence, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the

former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate interest in the power of his office ; in the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents ; who, though they would naturally incline to the Legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye to a Magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard.

But the Convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the Executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of the Legislative body. Instead of an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative already described. This is a power which would be much more readily exercised than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single *vero*, might not scruple to return it for reconsideration ; subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one third of each House concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable proportion of the Legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct and categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved by those to whom they are addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be more apt to be exercised ; and for this very reason, it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views

will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the Legislature at the same time; and this too in spite of the counterpoising weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be the case, than that such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A power of this nature in the Executive, will often have a silent and unperceived, though forcible operation. When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared.

This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this State vested in a Council, consisting of the Governor, with the Chancellor and Judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. And its utility has become so apparent, that persons who, in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of it, have from experience become its declared admirers.*

I have in another place remarked, that the Convention, in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the Constitution of this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One is that the Judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities; the other is that by being often associated with the Executive, they might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that Magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination

* MR. ABRAHAM YATES, a warm opponent of the plan of the Convention, is of this number. — *Publius*.

might by degrees be cemented between the Executive and Judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the Judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the Executive.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 25, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXXIII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE President of the United States is to be “ Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States *when called into the actual service* of the United States.” The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State Constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the Chief Magistrate with a Council, have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of Government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war, implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the Executive authority.

“ The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive de-

“partments, upon any subject relating to the duties of “their respective offices.” This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan; as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office.

He is also to be authorized “to grant reprieves and “pardons for offences against the United States, *except “in cases of impeachment.”* Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred, that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations, which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his *sole fiat*, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of Government, than a body of men.

The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both of the branches of the Legislative body. I shall

not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the Legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the representation of the People tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the offence. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case in the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the Commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved,

it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt.

PUBLIUS.

For the Independent Journal.

THE FÆDERALIST. No. LXXIV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

THE President is to have power, "by and with the
"advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con-
"cur."

Though this provision has been assailed on different grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan. One ground of objection is the trite topic of the

intermixture of powers ; some contending that the President ought alone to possess the power of making treaties ; others, that it ought to have been exclusively deposited in the Senate. Another source of objection is derived from the small number of persons by whom a treaty may be made. Of those who espouse this objection, a part are of opinion that the House of Representatives ought to have been associated in the business, while another part seem to think that nothing more was necessary than to have substituted two thirds of *all* the members of the Senate, to two thirds of the members *present*. As I flatter myself the observations made in a preceding number, upon this part of the plan, must have sufficed to place it, to a discerning eye, in a very favorable light, I shall here content myself with offering only some supplementary remarks, principally with a view to the objections which have been just stated.

With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely upon the explanations already given in other places, of the true sense of the rule upon which that objection is founded ; and shall take it for granted, as an inference from them, that the union of the Executive with the Senate, in the Article of treaties, is no infringement of that rule. I venture to add, that the particular nature of the power of making treaties, indicates a peculiar propriety in that union. Though several writers on the subject of Government place that power in the class of Executive authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary disposition ; for if we attend carefully to its operation, it will be found to partake more of the Legislative than of the Executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either of them. The essence of the Legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society ; while the execution of the laws, and the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose, or for the

common defence, seem to comprise all the functions of the Executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is, plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enactment of new ones; and still less to an exertion of the common strength. Its objects are *CONTRACTS* with foreign Nations, which have the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to the Legislative nor to the Executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the Legislative body in the office of making them.

However proper or safe it may be in Governments, where the Executive Magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that power to an elective Magistrate of four years' duration. It has been remarked, upon another occasion, and the remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his People, has personally too much at stake in the Government, to be in any material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. But a man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of Chief Magistrate, possessed of but a moderate or slender fortune, and looking forward to a period not very remote, when he may probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was taken, might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it would require superlative

virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the interests of the State to the acquisition of wealth. An ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents. The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue, which would make it wise in a Nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a Magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.

To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits of the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotiations. It is true, that the Senate would, in that case, have the option of employing him in this capacity; but they would also have the option of letting it alone; and pique or cabal might induce the latter rather than the former. Besides this, the ministerial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and respect of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of the Nation; and of course, would not be able to act with an equal degree of weight or efficacy. While the Union would, from this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of its external concerns, the People would lose the additional security which would result from the coöperation of the Executive. Though it would be imprudent to confide in him solely so important a trust, yet it cannot be doubted, that his participation would materially add to the safety of the society. It must indeed be clear, to a demonstration, that the joint possession of the power in question, by the President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by either of

them. And whoever has maturely weighed the circumstances which must concur in the appointment of a President, will be satisfied that the office will always bid fair to be filled by men of such characters, as to render their concurrence in the formation of treaties peculiarly desirable, as well on the score of wisdom, as on that of integrity.

The remarks made in a former number, which has been alluded to in another part of this paper, will apply with conclusive force against the admission of the House of Representatives to a share in the formation of treaties. The fluctuating, and, taking its future increase into the account, the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to National character; decision, *secrecy*, and despatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous. The very complication of the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives, and the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to keep them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be source of so great inconvenience and expense, as alone ought to condemn the project.

The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is that which would substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the members composing the senatorial body, to that of two thirds of the members *present*. It has been shown, under the second head of our inquiries, that all provisions which require more than the majority of any body to its Resolutions, have a direct tendency to em-

barrass the operations of the Government, and an indirect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority. This consideration seems sufficient to determine our opinion, that the Convention have gone as far in the endeavor to secure the advantage of numbers in the formation of treaties, as could have been reconciled either with the activity of the public councils or with a reasonable regard to the major sense of the community. If two thirds of the whole number of members had been required, it would, in many cases, from the non-attendance of a part, amount in practice to a necessity of unanimity. And the history of every political establishment in which this principle has prevailed, is a history of impotence, perplexity, and disorder. Proofs of this position might be adduced from the examples of the Roman Tribuneship, the Polish Diet, and the States General of the Netherlands; did not an example at home render foreign precedents unnecessary.

To require a fixed proportion of the whole body, would not, in all probability, contribute to the advantages of a numerous agency, better than merely to require a proportion of the attending members. The former, by making a determinate number at all times requisite to a resolution, diminishes the motives to punctual attendance. The latter, by making the capacity of the body to depend on a *proportion* which may be varied by the absence or presence of a single member, has the contrary effect. And as, by promoting punctuality, it tends to keep the body complete, there is great likelihood that its resolutions would generally be dictated by as great a number in this case, as in the other; while there would be much fewer occasions of delay. It ought not to be forgotten that under the existing Confederation, two members *may*, and usually *do* represent a State; whence it happens that Congress, who now are solely invested with *all the powers* of the Union,

rarely consists of a greater number of persons than would compose the intended Senate. If we add to this, that as the members vote by States, and that where there is only a single member present from a State, his vote is lost, it will justify a supposition that the active voices in the Senate, where the members are to vote individually, would rarely fall short in number of the active voices in the existing Congress. When, in addition to these considerations, we take into view the coöperation of the President, we shall not hesitate to infer that the People of America would have greater security against an improper use of the power of making treaties, under the new Constitution, than they now enjoy under the Confederation. And when we proceed still one step further, and look forward to the probable augmentation of the Senate, by the erection of new States, we shall not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the sufficiency of the members, to whose agency that power will be intrusted; but we shall probably be led to conclude, that a body more numerous than the Senate would be likely to become, would be very little fit for the proper discharge of the trust.

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Tuesday, April 1, 1788.*]

THE FÆDERALIST, No. LXXV.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

THE President is “to *nominate*, and, by and with
“the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other offi-

“cers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, or in the Courts of law, or in the Heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill up *all vacancies* which may happen *during the recess of the Senate*, by granting commissions which shall *expire* at the end of their next session.”

It has been observed in a former paper, that “the true test of a good Government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.” If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union, and it will not need proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character of its administration.

It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in ordinary cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It ought either to be vested in a single man; or in a *select* Assembly of a moderate number; or in a single man, with the concurrence of such an Assembly. The exercise of it by the People at large will be readily admitted to be impracticable; as waiving every other consideration, it would leave them little time to do anything else. When, therefore, mention is made in the subsequent reasonings, of an Assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood to relate to a select body or Assembly, of the description already given. The People collectively, from their number and from their dispersed situation, cannot be regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit of cabal and intrigue, which will be urged as the chief

objections to reposing the power in question in a body of men.

Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who have attended to the observations made in other parts of these papers, in relation to the appointment of the President, will, I presume, agree to the position, that there would always be great probability of having the place supplied by a man of abilities, at least respectable. Premising this, I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal, or perhaps even of superior discernment.

The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have *fewer* personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations, whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices by an Assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who

compose the Assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that." This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories, or of party negotiations.

The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision made, in this respect, by the Convention. They contend that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the appointments under the Fœderal Government. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from the power of *nomination*, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man, who with the approbation of the Senate should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no difference between nominating and appointing. The same motives which would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other.

And as no man could be appointed but on his previous nomination, every man who might be appointed would be, in fact, his choice.

But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the Chief Magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal.

To what purpose then require the coöperation of the Senate? I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration.

It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his private inclinations and interests, than when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice

to the discussion and determination of a different and independent body, and that body an entire branch of the Legislature. The possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing. The danger to his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective Magistrate, to his political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of popularity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would have great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.

To this reasoning it has been objected, that the President, by the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views. The supposition of universal venality in human nature, is little less an error in political reasoning, than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence; and experience justifies the theory. It has been found to exist in the most corrupt periods of the most corrupt Governments. The venality of the British House of Commons has been long a topic of accusation against that body, in the country to which they belong, as well as in this; and it cannot be doubted that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well founded. But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always a large proportion of the body, which consists of independent and public-spirited men, who have an influential weight in the councils of the Nation. Hence it is, (the

present reign not excepted,) that the sense of that body is often seen to control the inclinations of the monarch, both with regard to men and to measures. Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose, that the Executive might occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate, yet the supposition, that he could in general purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be forced and improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues, or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members, but that the necessity of its coöperation, in the business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct of that Magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the only reliance. The Constitution has provided some important guards against the danger of Executive influence upon the Legislative body: it declares, that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time *for which he was elected*, be appointed to any civil office under the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office."

PUBLIUS.

[*From the New York Packet, Friday, April 4, 1788.*]

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVI.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :

IT has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the coöperation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the Government as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a provision, which connects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the Government.

To this union of the Senate with the President, in the Article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested, that it would serve to give the President an undue influence over the Senate; and in others that it would have an opposite tendency; a strong proof that neither suggestion is true.

To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It amounts to this,—the President would have an improper *influence over* the Senate; because the Senate would have the power of *restraining* him. This is an absurdity in terms. It cannot admit of a doubt that the entire power of appointment would enable him much more effectually to establish a dangerous empire over that body, than a mere power of nomination subject to their control.

Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition: “the Senate would influence the Executive.” As I have had occasion to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness of the objection forbids a precise answer. In what manner is this influence to be exerted? In relation to what objects? The power of influencing a person, in the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. How could the Senate confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of employing their right of negative upon his nominations? If it be said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence in a favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a different conduct, I answer, that the instances in which the President could be personally interested in the result, would be too few to admit of his being materially affected by the compliances of the Senate. The power which can *originate* the disposition of honors and emoluments, is more likely to attract than to be attracted by the power which can merely obstruct their course. If by influencing the President be meant *restraining* him, this is precisely what must have been intended. And it has been shown that the restraint would be salutary, at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the good of that of appointment, and would in a great measure avoid its evils.

Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of the officers of the proposed Government, with that which is established by the Constitution of this State, a decided preference must be given to the former. In that plan, the power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the Executive. And as there would be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of the Legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment, from the mode of conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety; and the public would be at no loss to determine, what part had been performed by the different actors. The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the Executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.

The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment in this State. The Council of Appointment consists of from three to five persons, of whom the Governor is always one. This small body, shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, proceed to the execution of the trust committed to them. It is known that the Governor claims the right of nomination, upon the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the Constitution; but it is not known to what extent, or in what manner he exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is contradicted or opposed. The censure of a bad appointment on account of the uncertainty of its author, and for want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor duration. And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, all

idea of responsibility is lost. The most that the public can know, is that the Governor claims the right of nomination; that *two* out of the inconsiderable number of *four* men can too often be managed without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a particular Council should happen to be of an uncomplying character, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their opposition, by regulating the times of meeting in such a manner as to render their attendance inconvenient; and that from whatever cause it may proceed, a great number of very improper appointments are from time to time made. Whether a Governor of this State avails himself of the ascendant he must necessarily have, in this delicate and important part of the administration, to prefer to offices men who are best qualified for them, or whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a despicable and dangerous system of personal influence, are questions which, unfortunately for the community, can only be the subjects of speculation and conjecture.

Every mere Council of Appointment, however constituted, will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope. Their number, without an unwarrantable increase of expense, cannot be large enough to preclude a facility of combination. And as each member will have his friends and connections to provide for, the desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for places. The private attachments of one man might easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or of twenty mén, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments of the Government, in a few families, and would lead more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy, than any measure that could be contrived. If, to avoid an accumulation of

offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons who were to compose the Council, this would involve the mischiefs of a mutable administration in their full extent. Such a Council would also be more liable to Executive influence than the Senate, because they would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately under the public inspection. Such a Council, in fine, as a substitute for the plan of the Convention, would be productive of an increase of expense, a multiplication of the evils which spring from favoritism and intrigue in the distribution of public honors, a decrease of stability in the administration of the Government, and a diminution of the security against an undue influence of the Executive. And yet such a Council has been warmly contended for as an essential amendment in the proposed Constitution.

I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the subject of appointments, without taking notice of a scheme, for which there have appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean that of uniting the House of Representatives in the power of making them. I shall, however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance of any considerable part of the community. A body so fluctuating, and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred persons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by this union; and infinite delays and embarrassments would be occasioned. The example of most of the States in their local Constitutions, encourages us to reprobate the idea.

The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in giving information to Congress of the

state of the Union; in recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge expedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of adjournment; in receiving Ambassadors and other public Ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the officers of the United States.

Except some cavils about the power of convening *either* House of the Legislature, and that of receiving Ambassadors, no objection has been made to this class of authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any. It required, indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure, to invent exceptions to the parts which have been excepted to. In regard to the power of convening *either* House of the Legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect to the Senate at least, we can readily discover a good reason for it. As this body has a concurrent power with the Executive in the Article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call it together with a view to this object, when it would be unnecessary and improper to convene the House of Representatives. As to the reception of Ambassadors, what I have said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer.

We have now completed a survey of the structure and powers of the Executive department, which, I have endeavored to show, combines, as far as republican principles will admit, all the requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is, — Does it also combine the requisites to safety, in the republican sense, — a due dependence on the People — a due responsibility? The answer to this question has been anticipated in the investigation of its other characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these circumstances; from the election of the President once in four years by persons immediately chosen by the People for that purpose; and from

his being, at all times, liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law. But these precautions, great as they are, are not the only ones which the plan of the Convention has provided in favor of the public security. In the only instances in which the abuse of the Executive authority was materially to be feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the Legislative body. What more could be desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?

PUBLIUS.

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[THE FŒDERALIST.] No. LXXVIII.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]

WE proceed now to an examination of the Judiciary department of the proposed Government.

In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation the utility and necessity of a Fœderal Judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.

The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects:—1st, The mode of appointing the Judges;—2d, The tenure by which they are to hold their places;—3d. The partition of the Judiciary au-

thority between different courts, and their relations to each other.

First. As to the mode of appointing the Judges; this is the same with that of appointing the officers of the Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the two last numbers, that nothing can be said here which would not be useless repetition.

Second. As to the tenure by which the Judges are to hold their places: this chiefly concerns their duration in office; the provisions for their support; the precautions for their responsibility.

According to the plan of the Convention, all Judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices *during good behavior*; which is conformable to the most approved of the State Constitutions, and among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn into question by the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which disorders their imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the Judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of Government. In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the Prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any Government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.

Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a Government in which they are separated from each other, the Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the

honors, but holds the sword of the community. The Legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The Judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the Executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.

This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that the Judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power;* that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the People can never be endangered from that quarter: I mean so long as the Judiciary remains truly distinct from both the Legislature and Executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the Legislative and Executive powers."† And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the Judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such an union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from the natural feebleness of the Judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its coördinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute

* The celebrated MONTESQUIEU, speaking of them, says, "Of the three powers above mentioned, the

"JUDICIARY is next to nothing." *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I. page 186. — *Publius*.

† *Idem*, page 181. — *Publius*.

so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution; and in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.

The complete independence of the Courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the Legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no *ex post facto* laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than "through the medium of the Courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all Acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.

Some perplexity respecting the rights of the Courts to pronounce Legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the Judiciary to the Legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the American Constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.

There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No Legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the Representatives of the People are superior to the People themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not

only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

If it be said that the Legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the Representatives of the People to substitute their *will* to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the Courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the People and the Legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the Courts. A Constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the Judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular Act proceeding from the Legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute; the intention of the People to the intention of their agents.

Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the Judicial to the Legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the People is superior to both; and that where the will of the Legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the People, declared in the Constitution, the Judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.

This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between two contradictory laws, is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the Courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation; so far as they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of the other. The rule which has obtained in the Courts for determining their relative validity is, that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law, but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not enjoined upon the Courts by Legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an *equal* authority, that which was the last indication of its will should have the preference.

But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us, that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the Judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.

It can be of no weight to say that the Courts, on the pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute their own

pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the Legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The Courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the Legislative body. The observation, if it proved anything, would prove that there ought to be no Judges distinct from that body.

If then the Courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution, against Legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of Judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the Judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.

This independence of the Judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals, from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the People themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the Government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies,* in questioning that fundamental principle of republican Government, which admits the right of the People to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that the Representatives of the People, whenever a momen-

* Vide *Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania*, MARTIN'S *Speech*, &c. — *Publius*.

tary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions ; or that the Courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the Representative body. Until the People have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually ; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their Representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the Judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where Legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.

But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the independence of the Judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the Judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the Legislative body in passing them ; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the Courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our Governments, than but few may be aware

of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the Judiciary have already been felt in more States than one; and though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the Courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day. And every man must now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress.

That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the Courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from Judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or Legislature, there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the People, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.

There is yet a further and a weighty reason for the permanency of the Judicial offices; which is deducible from the nature of the qualifications they require. It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free Gov-

ernment. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the Courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society, who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of Judges. And making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the Government can have no great option between fit characters; and that a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the Bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In the present circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages on this score would be greater than they may at first sight appear; but it must be confessed, that they are far inferior to those which present themselves under the other aspects of the subject.

Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that the Convention acted wisely, in copying from the models of those Constitutions which have established *good behavior* as the tenure of their Judicial offices, in point of duration; and that so far from being blamable on this account, their plan would have been inexcusably defec-

tive, if it had wanted this important feature of good Government. The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution.

PUBLIUS.

[From M'LEAN'S *Edition*, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]

[THE FœDERALIST.] No. LXXIX.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]

NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the Judges, than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, *a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will*. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the Judicial from the Legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter. The enlightened friends to good Government, in every State, have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit precautions in the State Constitutions on this head. Some of these indeed have declared, that *permanent** salaries should be established for the Judges; but the experiment has in some instances shown, that such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude Legislative evasions. Something still more positive and unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan of the Convention accordingly has provided, that the

* *Vide* Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 13.
— *Publius*.

Judges of the United States "shall at *stated times* receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be *diminished* during their continuance in office."

This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible provision that could have been devised. It will readily be understood, that the fluctuations in the value of money, and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant to-day, might in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the Legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances; yet under such restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change the condition of the individual for the worse. A man may then be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation. The Clause which has been quoted combines both advantages. The salaries of Judicial offices may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen the allowance with which any particular Judge comes into office, in respect to him. It will be observed, that a difference has been made by the Convention between the compensation of the President and of the Judges. That of the former can neither be increased nor diminished. That of the latter can only not be diminished. This probably arose from the difference in the duration of the respective offices. As the President is to be elected for no more than four years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, fixed at the commencement of that period, will not continue to be such to its end. But with regard to the Judges, who, if they behave properly, will be secured in their places for life, it may well happen, especially in the early stages of the Government, that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their

first appointment, would become too small in the progress of their service.

This provision for the support of the Judges bears every mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed, that together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their independence than is discoverable in the Constitutions of any of the States, in regard to their own Judges.

The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the Article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct, by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point, which is consistent with the necessary independence of the Judicial character; and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own Judges.

The want of a provision for removing the Judges on account of inability, has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible, that such a provision would either not be practised upon, or would be more liable to abuse, than calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal and party attachments and enmities, than advance the interests of justice, or the public good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.

The Constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must forever be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular age as the criterion of inability. No

man can be a Judge beyond sixty. I believe there are few at present, who do not disapprove of this provision. There is no station, in relation to which it is less proper, than to that of a Judge. The deliberating and comparing faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond that period, in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance, we consider, how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor, and how improbable it is that any considerable proportion of the Bench, whether more or less numerous, should be in such a situation at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude, that limitations of this sort have little to recommend them. In a republic, where fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, the dismissal of men from stations in which they have served their country long and usefully, on which they depend for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any other occupation for a livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity, than is to be found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated Bench.

PUBLIUS.

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[THE FÆDERALIST.] No. LXXX.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]

TO judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the Fæderal Judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects.

It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the Judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to

these several descriptions of cases: 1st, To all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of Legislation; 2d, To all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the Articles of Union; 3d, To all those in which the United States are a party; 4th, To all those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves; 5th, To all those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased.

The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State Legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them? The States, by the plan of the Convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things; some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles of good Government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the Government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the Fæderal Courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the Articles of Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the Convention preferable to the former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States.

As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argument or comment, to make it clearer than it is in itself. If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the Judicial power of a Government being coextensive with its Legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the National laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent Courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in Government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.

Still less need be said in regard to the third point. Controversies between the Nation and its members or citizens, can only be properly referred to the National tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum.

The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of Courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow, that the Fæderal Judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity. A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed proper for the Fæderal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical, whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of

controversy was wholly relative to the *lex loci*, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his Sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations of a treaty, or the general Law of Nations. And a still greater objection to the distinction would result from the immense difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties, involve National questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned to the National tribunals.

The power of determining causes between two States, between one State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the Union than that which has been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture of the dissensions and private wars which distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution of the IMPERIAL CHAMBER by MAXIMILIAN, towards the close of the fifteenth century; and informs us, at the same time, of the vast influence of that institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the tranquillity of the Empire. This was a Court invested with authority to decide finally all differences among the members of the Germanic body.

A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States, under the authority of the Fæderal head, was not unattended to, even in the imperfect system by which they have been hitherto held together. But there are many other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. To some of these we have been witnesses in the course of our past experience. It will readily be conjectured that I allude to the fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many of the States. And though the proposed Constitution

establishes particular guards against the repetition of those instances which have heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend, that the spirit which produced them will assume new shapes that could not be foreseen nor specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of Fœderal superintendence and control.

It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." And if it be a just principle that every Government *ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions, by its own authority*, it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the National Judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal, which having no local attachments will be likely to be impartial between the different States and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.

The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the National Judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the Laws of Nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace. The most important part of them are, by the present Confederation, submitted to Fœderal jurisdiction.

The reasonableness of the agency of the National

Courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a Judge in his own cause, or in any cause, in respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the Fæderal courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies between different States and their citizens. And it ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants of different States, founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are of this description. The Courts of neither of the granting States could be expected to be unbiassed. The laws may have even prejudged the question, and tied the Courts down to decisions in favor of the grants of the State to which they belonged. And even where this had not been done, it would be natural that the Judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own Government.

Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which ought to regulate the constitution of the Fæderal Judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers of which, according to the plan of the Convention, it is to be composed. It is to comprehend "all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, and sub-

“jects.” This constitutes the entire mass of the Judicial authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It is then to extend,

First. To all cases in law and equity, *arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States.* This corresponds with the two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been asked, what is meant by “cases arising under the Constitution,” in contradistinction from those “arising under the laws of the United States?” The difference has been already explained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the State Legislatures furnish examples of it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction results from the Constitution, and will have no connection with any law of the United States. Should paper money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the controversies concerning it would be cases arising upon the Constitution and not the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This may serve as a sample of the whole.

It has also been asked, What need of the word “equity?” What equitable causes can grow out of the Constitution and laws of the United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation between individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of *fraud, accident, trust, or hardship*, which would render the matter an object of equitable, rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and established in several of the States. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a Court of Equity to relieve against what are called hard bargains: these are contracts in which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a Court of Law, yet there may have been some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which

a Court of Equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were concerned on either side, it would be impossible for the Fæderal judicatories to do justice without an equitable as well as a legal jurisdiction. Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants of different States, may afford another example of the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the Fæderal Courts. This reasoning may not be so palpable in those States where the formal and technical distinction between LAW and EQUITY is not maintained, as in this State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.

The Judiciary authority of the Union is to extend,

Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls. These belong to the fourth class of the enumerated cases, as they have an evident connection with the preservation of the National peace.

Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. These form, altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classes of causes, proper for the cognizance of the National Courts.

Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party. These constitute the third of those classes.

Fifth. To controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and partake, in some measure, of the nature of the last.

Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same State, *claiming lands under grants of different States.* These fall within the last class, and *are the only instances in which the proposed Constitution directly contemplates the cognizance of disputes between the citizens of the same State.*

Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. These have been already explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes, and have been shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the National judicature.

From this review of the particular powers of the Fœderal Judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears, that they are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the perfection of the system. If some partial inconveniences should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected, that the National Legislature will have ample authority to make such *exceptions*, and to prescribe such regulations, as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid objection to a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs, and to obtain general advantages.

PUBLIUS.

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[THE FœDERALIST.] No. LXXXI.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]

LET us now return to the partition of the Judiciary authority between different Courts, and their relations to each other.

“The Judicial power of the United States is” (by

the plan of the Convention) “to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.”*

That there ought to be one Court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be contested. The reasons for it have been assigned in another place, and are too obvious to need repetition. The only question that seems to have been raised concerning it, is, whether it ought to be a distinct body, or a branch of the Legislature. The same contradiction is observable in regard to this matter, which has been remarked in several other cases. The very men who object to the Senate as a Court of Impeachments, on the ground of an improper intermixture of powers, advocate, by implication at least, the propriety of vesting the ultimate decision of all causes, in the whole or in a part of the Legislative body.

The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this charge is founded, are to this effect:—“The authority of the proposed Supreme Court of the United States, which is to be a separate and independent body, will be superior to that of the Legislature. The power of construing the laws according to the *spirit* of the Constitution, will enable that Court to mould them into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions will not be in any manner subject to the revision or correction of the Legislative body. This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain, the Judicial power, in the last resort, resides in the House of Lords, which is a branch of the Legislature; and this part of the British Government has been imitated in the State Constitutions in general. The Parliament of Great Britain, and the Legislatures of the several States, can at any time rectify, by law, the exceptionable decisions of their respective Courts. But the errors

* Article 3, Sec. 1. — *Publius*.

“and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the United States will be uncontrollable and remediless.” This, upon examination, will be found to be altogether made up of false reasoning upon misconceived fact.

In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration which *directly* empowers the National Courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the Courts of every State. I admit, however, that the Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws, and that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of the Convention; but from the general theory of a limited Constitution; and as far as it is true, is equally applicable to most, if not to all the State Governments. There can be no objection, therefore, on this account, to the Fœderal judicature, which will not lie against the local judicatures in general, and which will not serve to condemn every Constitution that attempts to set bounds to Legislative discretion.

But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought to consist in the particular organization of the Supreme Court: in its being composed of a distinct body of magistrates instead of being one of the branches of the Legislature, as in the Government of Great Britain and that of this State. To insist upon this point, the authors of the objection must renounce the meaning they have labored to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring a separation of the departments of power. It shall, nevertheless, be conceded to them, agreeably to the interpretation given to that maxim in the course of these papers, that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of judging in a *part* of the Legislative body. But though this be not an absolute violation of that excellent rule, yet

it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be less eligible than the mode preferred by the Convention. From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had operated in making them would be too apt in interpreting them; still less could it be expected, that men who had infringed the Constitution, in the character of Legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in the character of Judges. Nor is this all; every reason which recommends the tenure of good behavior for Judicial offices, militates against placing the Judiciary power, in the last resort, in a body composed of men chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in referring the determinations of causes, in the first instance, to Judges of permanent standing; in the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men, who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the Legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of Judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear, that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides, will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.

These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States, who have committed the Judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the Legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to

the supposition of those who have represented the plan of the Convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the Constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference which has been given to those models is highly to be commended.

It is not true, in the second place, that the Parliament of Great Britain, or the Legislatures of the particular States, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective Courts, in any other sense than might be done by a future Legislature of the United States. The theory, neither of the British, nor the State Constitutions, authorizes the revisal of a Judicial sentence by a Legislative act. Nor is there anything in the proposed Constitution, more than in either of them, by which it is forbidden. In the former, as well as in the latter, the impropriety of the thing on the general principles of law and reason, is the sole obstacle. A Legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases. This is the principle, and it applies in all its consequences, exactly in the same manner and extent, to the State Governments, as to the National Government now under consideration. Not the least difference can be pointed out in any view of the subject.

It may in the last place be observed, that the supposed danger of Judiciary encroachments on the Legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. Particular misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the Legislature, may now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the political system. This may be inferred with certainty, from the general

nature of the Judicial power; from the objects to which it relates; from the manner in which it is exercised; from its comparative weakness; and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And the inference is greatly fortified by the consideration of the important constitutional check which the power of instituting impeachments in one part of the Legislative body, and of determining upon them in the other, would give to that body upon the members of the Judicial department. This is alone a complete security. There never can be danger that the Judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the Legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption, by degrading them from their stations. While this ought to remove all apprehensions on the subject, it affords, at the same time, a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a Court for the Trial of Impeachments.

Having now examined, and, I trust, removed the objections to the distinct and independent organization of the Supreme Court, I proceed to consider the propriety of the power of constituting inferior Courts,* and the relations which will subsist between these and the former.

The power of constituting inferior Courts, is evidently calculated to obviate the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every case of Fœderal cognizance. It is intended to enable the National Government to institute or *authorize*, in each State or district of the

* This power has been absurdly represented as intended to abolish all the County Courts in the several States, which are commonly called Inferior Courts. But the expressions of the Constitution are, to constitute "tribunals INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT;" and the

evident design of the provision is, to enable the institution of local Courts, subordinate to the Supreme, either in States or larger districts. It is ridiculous to imagine that County Courts were in contemplation. — *Publius*.

United States, a tribunal competent to the determination of matters of National jurisdiction within its limits.

But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose have been accomplished by the instrumentality of the State Courts? This admits of different answers. Though the fitness and competency of those Courts should be allowed in the utmost latitude, yet the substance of the power in question may still be regarded as a necessary part of the plan, if it were only to empower the National Legislature to commit to them the cognizance of causes arising out of the National Constitution. To confer the power of determining such causes upon the existing Courts of the several States, would perhaps be as much "to constitute tribunals," as to create new Courts with the like power. But ought not a more direct and explicit provision to have been made in favor of the State Courts? There are, in my opinion, substantial reasons against such a provision: the most discerning cannot foresee, how far the prevalence of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of National causes; whilst every man may discover, that Courts constituted like those of some of the States would be improper channels of the Judicial authority of the Union. State Judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the National laws. And if there was a necessity for confiding the original cognizance of causes arising under those laws to them, there would be a correspondent necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible. In proportion to the grounds of confidence in, or distrust of the subordinate tribunals, ought to be the facility or difficulty of appeals. And well satisfied as I am of the propriety of the appellate jurisdiction, in the several classes of causes to which it is extended by the plan of the Convention,

I should consider everything calculated to give, in practice, an *unrestrained course* to appeals, as a source of public and private inconvenience.

I am not sure, but that it will be found highly expedient and useful, to divide the United States into four, or five, or half a dozen districts ; and to institute a Fæderal Court in each district, in lieu of one in every State. The Judges of these Courts, with the aid of the State Judges, may hold circuits for the trial of causes in the several parts of the respective districts. Justice through them may be administered with ease and despatch ; and appeals may be safely circumscribed within a narrow compass. This plan appears to me at present the most eligible of any that could be adopted ; and in order to it, it is necessary that the power of constituting inferior Courts should exist in the full extent in which it is to be found in the proposed Constitution.

These reasons seem sufficient to satisfy a candid mind, that the want of such a power would have been a great defect in the plan. Let us now examine, in what manner the Judicial authority is to be distributed between the Supreme and the inferior Courts of the Union.

The Supreme Court is to be invested with original jurisdiction, only “in cases affecting Ambassadors, other “public Ministers, and Consuls, and those in which a “STATE shall be a party.” Public Ministers of every class are the immediate representatives of their Sovereigns. All questions in which they are concerned are so directly connected with the public peace, that, as well for the preservation of this, as out of respect to the sovereignties they represent, it is both expedient and proper, that such questions should be submitted in the first instance to the highest judicatory of the Nation. Though Consuls have not in strictness a diplomatic character, yet as they are

the public agents of the Nations to which they belong, the same observation is in a great measure applicable to them. In cases in which a State might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an inferior tribunal.

Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of this paper, I shall take occasion to mention here a supposition which has excited some alarm upon very mistaken grounds. It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one State to the citizens of another would enable them to prosecute that State in the Fæderal Courts for the amount of those securities: a suggestion, which the following considerations prove to be without foundation.

It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual *without its consent*. This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the Government of every State in the Union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty, were discussed in considering the Article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is no color to pretend that the State Governments would by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint, but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to

authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident, it could not be done, without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the Fœderal Courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a preëxisting right of the State Governments, a power which would involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.

Let us resume the train of our observations. We have seen, that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be confined to two classes of causes, and those of a nature rarely to occur. In all other cases of Fœderal cognizance, the original jurisdiction would appertain to the inferior tribunals; and the Supreme Court would have nothing more than an appellate jurisdiction, "with such *exceptions*, and under such *regulations*, as "the Congress shall make."

The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely called in question in regard to matters of law; but the clamors have been loud against it as applied to matters of fact. Some well-intentioned men in this State, deriving their notions from the language and forms which obtain in our Courts, have been induced to consider it as an implied supersedure of the trial by jury, in favor of the civil-law mode of trial, which prevails in our Courts of Admiralty, Probates, and Chancery. A technical sense has been affixed to the term "appellate," which, in our law parlance, is commonly used in reference to appeals in the course of the civil law. But if I am not misinformed, the same meaning would not be given to it in any part of New England. There an appeal from one jury to another, is familiar both in language and practice, and is even a matter of course, until there have been two verdicts on one side. The word "appellate," therefore, will not be understood in the same sense in New England as in New York, which

shows the impropriety of a technical interpretation derived from the jurisprudence of any particular State. The expression, taken in the abstract, denotes nothing more than the power of one tribunal to review the proceedings of another, either as to the law or fact, or both. The mode of doing it may depend on ancient custom or legislative provision, (in a new Government it must depend on the latter,) and may be with or without the aid of a jury, as may be judged advisable. If, therefore, the reëxamination of a fact once determined by a jury, should in any case be admitted under the proposed Constitution, it may be so regulated as to be done by a second jury, either by remanding the cause to the Court below for a second trial of the fact, or by directing an issue immediately out of the Supreme Court.

But it does not follow that the reëxamination of a fact once ascertained by a jury, will be permitted in the Supreme Court. Why may not it be said, with the strictest propriety, when a writ of error is brought from an inferior to a superior Court of law in this State, that the latter has jurisdiction of the fact, as well as the law? It is true it cannot institute a new inquiry concerning the fact, but it takes cognizance of it as it appears upon the record, and pronounces the law arising upon it.* This is jurisdiction of both fact and law; nor is it even possible to separate them. Though the common-law Courts of this State ascertain disputed facts by a jury, yet they unquestionably have jurisdiction of both fact and law; and accordingly when the former is agreed in the pleadings, they have no recourse to a jury, but proceed at once to judgment. I contend, therefore, on this ground, that the expressions, "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact," do not necessarily imply a reëxamination in the Supreme Court of facts decided by juries in the inferior Courts.

* This word is composed of *ius* ing or pronouncing of the law.—and *dictio*, *juris dictio*, or a speak- *Publius*.

The following train of ideas may well be imagined to have influenced the Convention, in relation to this particular provision. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (it may have been argued) will extend to causes determinable in different modes, some in the course of the COMMON LAW, others in the course of the CIVIL LAW. In the former, the revision of the law only will be, generally speaking, the proper province of the Supreme Court; in the latter, the reëxamination of the fact is agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which prize causes are an example, might be essential to the preservation of the public peace. It is therefore necessary, that the appellate jurisdiction should, in certain cases, extend in the broadest sense to matters of fact. It will not answer to make an express exception of cases which shall have been originally tried by a jury, because in the Courts of some of the States *all causes* are tried in this mode;* and such an exception would preclude the revision of matters of fact, as well where it might be proper, as where it might be improper. To avoid all inconveniences, it will be safest to declare generally, that the Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and *fact*, and that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such *exceptions* and regulations as the National Legislature may prescribe. This will enable the Government to modify it in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security.

This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all doubt that the supposed *abolition* of the trial by jury, by the operation of this provision, is fallacious and untrue. The Legislature of the United States would certainly have full power to provide, that in appeals to the Supreme Court there should be no reëxamination of facts,

* I hold that the States will have in many cases of Fæderal cognizance, as will be explained in my subordinate Fæderal judicatories, next paper. — *Publius*.

where they had been tried in the original causes by juries. This would certainly be an authorized exception; but if, for the reason already intimated, it should be thought too extensive, it might be qualified with a limitation to such causes only as are determinable at common law in that mode of trial.

The amount of the observations hitherto made on the authority of the Judicial department is this: that it has been carefully restricted to those causes which are manifestly proper for the cognizance of the National Judicature; that in the partition of this authority, a very small portion of original jurisdiction has been reserved to the Supreme Court, and the rest consigned to the subordinate tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess an appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, in all the cases referred to them, but subject to any *exceptions* and *regulations* which may be thought advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction does, in no case, *abolish* the trial by jury; and that an ordinary degree of prudence and integrity in the National Councils, will insure us solid advantages from the establishment of the proposed Judiciary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences which have been predicted from that source.

PUBLIUS.

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[THE FŒDERALIST.] No. LXXXII.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]

THE erection of a new Government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these

may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establishment of a Constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. 'Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.

Such questions, accordingly, have arisen upon the plan proposed by the Convention, and particularly concerning the Judiciary department. The principal of these respect the situation of the State Courts, in regard to those causes which are to be submitted to Fœderal jurisdiction. Is this to be exclusive, or are those Courts to possess a concurrent jurisdiction? If the latter, in what relation will they stand to the National tribunals? These are inquiries which we meet with in the mouths of men of sense, and which are certainly entitled to attention.

The principles established in a former paper* teach us that the States will retain all *preëxisting* authorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the Fœderal head; and that this exclusive delegation can only exist in one of three cases: where an exclusive authority is, in express terms, granted to the Union; or where a particular authority is granted to the Union, and the exercise of a like authority is prohibited to the States; or where an authority is granted to the Union, with which a similar authority in the States would be utterly incompatible. Though these principles may not apply with the same force to the Judiciary, as to the Legislative power, yet I am inclined to think, that they are, in the main, just with respect to the former, as well as the latter. And under this impression, I shall lay it down as a rule, that the State Courts will *retain* the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away in one of the enumerated modes.

* No. XXXI. — *Publius*.

The only thing in the proposed Constitution, which wears the appearance of confining the causes of Fæderal cognizance to the Fæderal Courts, is contained in this passage :—“ The JUDICIAL POWER of the United States “*shall be vested* in one Supreme Court, and in *such* inferior Courts as the Congress shall from time to time “ordain and establish.” This might either be construed to signify, that the Supreme and subordinate Courts of the Union should alone have the power of deciding those causes, to which their authority is to extend ; or simply to denote, that the organs of the National Judiciary should be one Supreme Court, and as many subordinate Courts as Congress should think proper to appoint ; or in other words, that the United States should exercise the Judicial power with which they are to be invested, through one supreme tribunal, and a certain number of inferior ones, to be instituted by them. The first excludes, the last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribunals ; and as the first would amount to an alienation of State power by implication, the last appears to me the most natural and the most defensible construction.

But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes, of which the State Courts have previous cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to cases which may grow out of, and be *peculiar* to, the Constitution to be established ; for not to allow the State Courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered as the abridgment of a preëxisting authority. I mean not therefore to contend that the United States, in the course of legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to the Fæderal Courts, solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient ; but I hold that the State Courts will be di-

vested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the National Legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. This I infer from the nature of Judiciary power, and from the general genius of the system. The Judiciary power of every Government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our Courts. When in addition to this we consider the State Governments and the National Governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State Courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.

Here another question occurs: What relation would subsist between the National and State Courts in these instances of concurrent jurisdiction? I answer, that an appeal would certainly lie from the latter, to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution in direct terms gives an appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in all the enumerated cases of Fæderal cognizance, in which it is not to have an original one, without a single expression to confine its operation to the inferior Fæderal Courts. The objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone contemplated. From this circumstance, and from the reason of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend to the State tribunals. Either this must be the case, or the local Courts must be excluded from a concurrent

jurisdiction in matters of National concern, else the Judiciary authority of the Union may be eluded at the pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of these consequences ought, without evident necessity, to be involved; the latter would be entirely inadmissible, as it would defeat some of the most important and avowed purposes of the proposed Government, and would essentially embarrass its measures. Nor do I perceive any foundation for such a supposition. Agreeably to the remark already made, the National and State systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE. The Courts of the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal, which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of National justice and the rules of National decisions. The evident aim of the plan of the Convention is, that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the Courts of the Union. To confine, therefore, the general expressions giving appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, to appeals from the subordinate Fœderal Courts, instead of allowing their extension to the State Courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of interpretation.

But could an appeal be made to lie from the State Courts to the subordinate Fœderal judicatories? This is another of the questions which have been raised, and of greater difficulty than the former. The following considerations countenance the affirmative. The plan of the Convention, in the first place, authorizes the National Legislature "to constitute tribunals inferior to the "Supreme Court."* It declares, in the next place, that "the JUDICIAL POWER of the United States *shall be vested*

* Sec. 8th, Art. 1st. — *Publius*.

“in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress shall ordain and establish ;” and it then proceeds to enumerate the cases, to which this Judicial power shall extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court into original and appellate, but gives no definition of that of the subordinate Courts. The only outlines described for them are, that they shall be “inferior to the Supreme Court,” and that they shall not exceed the specified limits of the Fœderal Judiciary. Whether their authority shall be original or appellate, or both, is not declared. All this seems to be left to the discretion of the Legislature. And this being the case, I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the State Courts to the subordinate National tribunals; and many advantages attending the power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish the motives to the multiplication of Fœderal Courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The State tribunals may then be left with a more entire charge of Fœderal causes; and appeals, in most cases in which they may be deemed proper, instead of being carried to the Supreme Court, may be made to lie from the State Courts to District Courts of the Union.

PUBLIUS.

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[THE FœDERALIST.] No. LXXXIII.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK :]

THE objection to the plan of the Convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is *that relative to the*

want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated, has been repeatedly adverted to and exposed; but continues to be pursued in all the conversations and writings of the opponents of the plan. The mere silence of the Constitution in regard to *civil causes*, is represented as an abolition of the trial by jury; and the declamations to which it has afforded a pretext are artfully calculated to induce a persuasion, that this pretended abolition is complete and universal; extending not only to every species of civil, but even to *criminal causes*. To argue with respect to the latter, would, however, be as vain and fruitless, as to attempt the serious proof of the *existence of matter*, or to demonstrate any of those propositions, which, by their own internal evidence, force conviction, when expressed in language adapted to convey their meaning.

With regard to civil causes, subtleties almost too contemptible for refutation have been employed to countenance the surmise, that a thing, which is only *not provided for*, is entirely *abolished*. Every man of discernment must at once perceive the wide difference between *silence* and *abolition*. But as the inventors of this fallacy have attempted to support it by certain *legal maxims* of interpretation, which they have perverted from their true meaning, it may not be wholly useless to explore the ground they have taken.

The maxims on which they rely are of this nature: "A specification of particulars is an exclusion of generals;" or, "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." Hence, say they, as the Constitution has established the trial by jury in criminal cases, and is silent in respect to civil, this silence is an implied prohibition of trial by jury, in regard to the latter.

The rules of legal interpretation are rules of *common sense*, adopted by the Courts in the construction of the

laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of them, is its conformity to the source from which they are derived. This being the case, let me ask, if it is consistent with common sense to suppose, that a provision obliging the Legislative power to commit the trial of criminal causes to juries, is a privation of its right to authorize or permit that mode of trial in other cases? Is it natural to suppose, that a command to do one thing is a prohibition to the doing of another, which there was a previous power to do, and which is not incompatible with the thing commanded to be done? If such a supposition would be unnatural and unreasonable, it cannot be rational to maintain, that an injunction of the trial by jury in certain cases, is an interdiction of it in others.

A power to constitute Courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial; and consequently, if nothing was said in the Constitution, on the subject of Juries, the Legislature would be at liberty, either to adopt that institution, or to let it alone. This discretion, in regard to criminal causes, is abridged by the express injunction of trial by jury in all such cases; but it is of course left at large in relation to civil causes, there being a total silence on this head. The specification of an obligation to try all criminal causes in a particular mode, excludes indeed the obligation or necessity of employing the same mode in civil causes, but does not abridge *the power* of the Legislature to exercise that mode, if it should be thought proper. The pretence, therefore, that the National Legislature would not be at full liberty to submit all the civil causes of Fœderal cognizance to the determination of juries, is a pretence destitute of all just foundation.

From these observations this conclusion results, that the trial by jury in civil cases would not be abolished; and that the use attempted to be made of the maxims which have been quoted, is contrary to reason and com-

mon sense, and therefore not admissible. Even if these maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding with the ideas of those who employ them upon the present occasion, which, however, is not the case, they would still be inapplicable to a Constitution of Government. In relation to such a subject, the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the true criterion of construction.

Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear the use made of them, let us endeavor to ascertain their proper use and true meaning. This will be best done by examples. The plan of the Convention declares, that the power of Congress, or, in other words, of the *National Legislature*, shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a general Legislative authority; because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority was intended.

In like manner, the Judicial authority of the Fœderal Judicatures is declared by the Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those cases marks the precise limits, beyond which the Fœderal Courts cannot extend their jurisdiction; because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification would be nugatory, if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.

These examples are sufficient to elucidate the maxims which have been mentioned, and to designate the manner in which they should be used. But that there may be no possibility of misapprehension upon this subject, I shall add one case more, to demonstrate the proper use of these maxims, and the abuse which has been made of them.

Let us suppose that by the laws of this State a married woman was incapable of conveying her estate, and

that the Legislature, considering this as an evil, should enact that she might dispose of her property by deed executed in the presence of a magistrate. In such a case there can be no doubt but the specification would amount to an exclusion of any other mode of conveyance; because the woman having no previous power to alienate her property, the specification determines the particular mode which she is, for that purpose, to avail herself of. But let us further suppose that in a subsequent part of the same Act it should be declared that no woman should dispose of any estate of a determinate value without the consent of three of her nearest relations, signified by their signing the deed; could it be inferred from this regulation that a married woman might not procure the approbation of her relations to a deed for conveying property of inferior value? The position is too absurd to merit a refutation, and yet this is precisely the position which those must establish who contend that the trial by juries, in civil cases, is abolished, because it is expressly provided for in cases of a criminal nature.

From these observations, it must appear unquestionably true, that trial by jury is in no case abolished by the proposed Constitution; and it is equally true, that in those controversies between individuals in which the great body of the People are likely to be interested, that institution will remain precisely in the same situation in which it is placed by the State Constitutions, and will be in no degree altered or influenced by the adoption of the plan under consideration. The foundation of this assertion is, that the National Judiciary will have no cognizance of them, and of course they will remain determinable as heretofore by the State Courts only, and in the manner which the State Constitutions and laws prescribe. All land causes, except where claims under the grants of different States come into question, and all

other controversies between the citizens of the same State, unless where they depend upon positive violations of the Articles of Union, by Acts of the State Legislatures, will belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of the State tribunals. Add to this, that admiralty causes, and almost all those which are of equity jurisdiction, are determinable under our own Government without the intervention of a jury; and the inference from the whole will be, that this institution, as it exists with us at present, cannot possibly be affected, to any great extent, by the proposed alteration in our system of Government.

The friends and adversaries of the plan of the Convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free Government. For my own part, the more the operation of the institution has fallen under my observation, the more reason I have discovered for holding it in high estimation; and it would be altogether superfluous to examine to what extent it deserves to be esteemed useful or essential in a representative republic, or how much more merit it may be entitled to, as a defence against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch, than as a barrier to the tyranny of popular Magistrates in a popular Government. Discussions of this kind would be more curious than beneficial, as all are satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to liberty. But I must acknowledge that I cannot readily discern the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended offences, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of Judicial despotism; and these have all relation

to criminal proceedings. The trial by jury in criminal cases, aided by the *habeas corpus* Act, seems therefore to be alone concerned in the question. And both of these are provided for, in the most ample manner, in the plan of the Convention.

It has been observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation. This observation deserves to be canvassed.

It is evident that it can have no influence upon the Legislature, in regard to the *amount* of the taxes to be laid, to the *objects* upon which they are to be imposed, or to the *rule* by which they are to be apportioned. If it can have any influence, therefore, it must be upon the mode of collection, and the conduct of the officers intrusted with the execution of the revenue laws.

As to the mode of collection in this State, under our own Constitution, the trial by jury is in most cases out of use. The taxes are usually levied by the more summary proceeding of distress and sale, as in cases of rent. And it is acknowledged on all hands, that this is essential to the efficacy of the revenue laws. The dilatory course of a trial at law to recover the taxes imposed on individuals, would neither suit the exigencies of the public, nor promote the convenience of the citizens. It would often occasion an accumulation of costs, more burdensome than the original sum of the tax to be levied.

And as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue, the provision in favor of trial by jury in criminal cases, will afford the security aimed at. Wilful abuses of a public authority, to the oppression of the subject, and every species of official extortion, are offences against the Government; for which the persons who commit them may be indicted and punished according to the circumstances of the case.

The excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases appears to depend on circumstances foreign to the preser-

vation of liberty. The strongest argument in its favor is, that it is a security against corruption. As there is always more time, and better opportunity, to tamper with a standing body of magistrates, than with a jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to suppose, that a corrupt influence would more easily find its way to the former than to the latter. The force of this consideration is, however, diminished by others. The Sheriff, who is the summoner of ordinary juries, and the Clerks of Courts, who have the nomination of special juries, are themselves standing officers, and acting individually, may be supposed more accessible to the touch of corruption than the Judges, who are a collective body. It is not difficult to see, that it would be in the power of those officers to select jurors who would serve the purpose of the party as well as a corrupted Bench. In the next place, it may fairly be supposed, that there would be less difficulty in gaining some of the jurors promiscuously taken from the public mass, than in gaining men who had been chosen by the Government for their probity and good character. But making every deduction for these considerations, the trial by jury must still be a valuable check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies the impediments to its success. As matters now stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both Court and jury; for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the Court will generally grant a new trial, and it would be in most cases of little use to practice upon the jury, unless the Court could be likewise gained. Here then is a double security; and it will readily be perceived, that this complicated agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions. By increasing the obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either. The temptations to prostitution, which the Judges might have to surmount, must certainly be much fewer, while the coöperation of a jury is necessary, than they might

be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination of all causes.

Notwithstanding, therefore, the doubts I have expressed, as to the essentiality of trial by jury in civil cases, to liberty, I admit that it is in most cases, under proper regulations, an excellent method of determining questions of property; and that on this account alone, it would be entitled to a constitutional provision in its favor if it were possible to fix the limits within which it ought to be comprehended. There is, however, in all cases, great difficulty in this; and men not blinded by enthusiasm, must be sensible, that in a Fœderal Government, which is a composition of societies whose ideas and institutions in relation to the matter materially vary from each other, that difficulty must be not a little augmented. For my own part, at every new view I take of the subject, I become more convinced of the reality of the obstacles, which, we are authoritatively informed, prevented the insertion of a provision on this head in the plan of the Convention.

The great difference between the limits of the jury trial in different States, is not generally understood. And as it must have considerable influence on the sentence we ought to pass upon the omission complained of in regard to this point, an explanation of it is necessary. In this State, our Judicial establishments resemble, more nearly than in any other, those of Great Britain. We have Courts of common law, Courts of Probates, (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual Courts in England,) a Court of Admiralty, and a Court of Chancery. In the Courts of common law only, the trial by jury prevails, and this with some exceptions. In all the others, a single Judge presides, and proceeds in general either according to the course of the canon or civil law, without the aid of a jury.* In New Jersey,

* It has been erroneously insinuated, with regard to the Court of Chancery, that this Court generally tries disputed facts by a jury. The

there is a Court of Chancery which proceeds like ours, but neither Courts of Admiralty, nor of Probates, in the sense in which these last are established with us. In that State the Courts of common law have the cognizance of those causes, which with us are determinable in the Courts of Admiralty and of Probates, and of course the jury trial is more extensive in New Jersey, than in New York. In Pennsylvania, this is perhaps still more the case, for there is no Court of Chancery in that State, and its common-law Courts have equity jurisdiction. It has a Court of Admiralty, but none of Probates, at least on the plan of ours. Delaware has in these respects imitated Pennsylvania. Maryland approaches more nearly to New York, as does also Virginia, except that the latter has a plurality of Chancellors. North Carolina bears most affinity to Pennsylvania; South Carolina to Virginia. I believe, however, that in some of those States which have distinct Courts of Admiralty, the causes depending in them are triable by juries. In Georgia there are none but common-law Courts, and an appeal of course lies from the verdict of one jury to another, which is called a special jury, and for which a particular mode of appointment is marked out. In Connecticut, they have no distinct Courts either of Chancery or of Admiralty, and their Courts of Probates have no jurisdiction of causes. Their common-law Courts have admiralty, and, to a certain extent, equity jurisdiction. In cases of importance, their General Assembly is the only Court of Chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the trial by jury extends in *practice* further than in any other State yet mentioned. Rhode Island is, I believe, in this particular, pretty much in the situation of Connecticut. Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in regard to the blending of law, equity, and admiralty jurisdictions, are truth is, that references to a jury in validity of a devise of land comes that Court rarely happen, and are in into question. — *Publius*.
 no case necessary but where the

in a similar predicament. In the four Eastern States, the trial by jury not only stands upon a broader foundation than in the other States, but it is attended with a peculiarity unknown, in its full extent, to any of them. There is an appeal *of course* from one jury to another, till there have been two verdicts out of three on one side.

From this sketch it appears, that there is a material diversity, as well in the modification as in the extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases, in the several States; and from this fact, these obvious reflections flow: first, that no general rule could have been fixed upon by the Convention, which would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States; and secondly, that more, or at least as much might have been hazarded, by taking the system of any one State for a standard, as by omitting a provision altogether, and leaving the matter as has been done to Legislative regulation.

The propositions which have been made for supplying the omission, have rather served to illustrate, than to obviate the difficulty of the thing. The minority of Pennsylvania have proposed this mode of expression for the purpose — “Trial by jury shall be as heretofore” — and this I maintain would be senseless and nugatory. The United States, in their united or collective capacity, are the OBJECT to which all general provisions in the Constitution must necessarily be construed to refer. Now, it is evident, that though trial by jury, with various limitations, is known in each State individually, yet in the United States, *as such*, it is, at this time altogether unknown; because the present Fæderal Government has no Judiciary power whatever; and consequently, there is no proper antecedent or previous establishment, to which the term *heretofore* could relate. It would therefore be destitute of a precise meaning, and inoperative from its uncertainty.

As on the one hand, the form of the provision would

not fulfil the intent of its proposers; so on the other, if I apprehend that intent rightly, it would be in itself inexpedient. I presume it to be, that causes in the Fæderal Courts should be tried by jury, if, in the State where the Courts sat, that mode of trial would obtain in a similar case in the State Courts, — that is to say, admiralty causes should be tried in Connecticut by a jury, in New York without one. The capricious operation of so dissimilar a method of trial in the same cases, under the same Government, is of itself sufficient to indispose every well-regulated judgment towards it. Whether the cause should be tried with or without a jury, would depend, in a great number of cases, on the accidental situation of the Court and parties.

But this is not, in my estimation, the greatest objection. I feel a deep and deliberate conviction, that there are many cases in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one. I think it so particularly, in cases which concern the public peace with foreign nations; that is, in most cases where the question turns wholly on the Laws of Nations. Of this nature, among others, are all prize causes. Juries cannot be supposed competent to investigations, that require a thorough knowledge of the laws and usages of nations; and they will sometimes be under the influence of impressions which will not suffer them to pay sufficient regard to those considerations of public policy, which ought to guide their inquiries. There would of course be always danger, that the rights of other nations might be infringed by their decisions, so as to afford occasions of reprisal and war. Though the proper province of juries be to determine matters of fact, yet in most cases, legal consequences are complicated with fact in such a manner, as to render a separation impracticable.

It will add great weight to this remark, in relation to prize causes, to mention that the method of determining

them has been thought worthy of particular regulation in various treaties between different powers of Europe, and that, pursuant to such treaties, they are determinable in Great Britain in the last resort before the King himself in his Privy Council, where the fact as well as the law undergoes a reëxamination. This alone demonstrates the impolicy of inserting a fundamental provision in the Constitution which would make the State systems a standard for the National Government in the Article under consideration, and the danger of encumbering the Government with any constitutional provisions, the propriety of which is not indisputable.

My convictions are equally strong, that great advantages result from the separation of the equity from the law jurisdiction; and that the causes which belong to the former, would be improperly committed to juries. The great and primary use of a Court of equity is to give relief *in extraordinary cases*, which are *exceptions** to general rules. To unite the jurisdiction of such cases with the ordinary jurisdiction, must have a tendency to unsettle the general rules, and to subject every case that arises to a *special* determination; while a separation of the one from the other has the contrary effect of rendering one a sentinel over the other, and of keeping each within the expedient limits. Besides this, the circumstances that constitute cases proper for Courts of equity are in many instances so nice and intricate, that they are incompatible with the genius of trials by jury. They require often such long, deliberate and critical investigation, as would be impracticable to men called from their occupations, and obliged to decide before they were permitted to return to them. The simplicity and expedition which form the distinguishing characters of this

* It is true that the principles by which that relief is governed are now reduced to a regular system; but it is not the less true that they are in the main applicable to SPECIAL circumstances, which form exceptions to general rules.— *Publius*.

mode of trial require, that the matter to be decided should be reduced to some single and obvious point; while the litigations usual in Chancery, frequently comprehend a long train of minute and independent particulars.

It is true, that the separation of the equity from the legal jurisdiction is peculiar to the English system of jurisprudence: which is the model that has been followed in several of the States. But it is equally true, that the trial by jury has been unknown in every case in which they have been united. And the separation is essential to the preservation of that institution in its pristine purity. The nature of a Court of equity will readily permit the extension of its jurisdiction to matters of law; but it is not a little to be suspected, that the attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the Courts of law to matters of equity will not only be unproductive of the advantages which may be derived from Courts of Chancery, on the plan upon which they are established in this State, but will tend gradually to change the nature of the Courts of law, and to undermine the trial by jury, by introducing questions too complicated for a decision in that mode.

These appear to be conclusive reasons against incorporating the systems of all the States, in the formation of the National Judiciary, according to what may be conjectured to have been the intent of the Pennsylvania minority. Let us now examine, how far the proposition of Massachusetts is calculated to remedy the supposed defect.

It is in this form: "In civil actions between citizens of different States, every issue of fact, arising in *actions at common law*, may be tried by a jury if the parties, or either of them, request it."

This, at best, is a proposition confined to one description of causes; and the inference is fair, either that the

Massachusetts Convention considered that as the only class of Fæderal causes, in which the trial by jury would be proper; or that if desirous of a more extensive provision, they found it impracticable to devise one which would properly answer the end. If the first, the omission of a regulation respecting so partial an object can never be considered as a material imperfection in the system. If the last, it affords a strong corroboration of the extreme difficulty of the thing.

But this is not all: if we advert to the observations already made respecting the Courts that subsist in the several States of the Union, and the different powers exercised by them, it will appear, that there are no expressions more vague and indeterminate than those which have been employed to characterize *that* species of causes which it is intended shall be entitled to a trial by jury. In this State, the boundaries between actions at common law and actions of equitable jurisdiction, are ascertained in conformity to the rules which prevail in England upon that subject. In many of the other States, the boundaries are less precise. In some of them, every cause is to be tried in a Court of common law, and upon that foundation every action may be considered as an action at common law, to be determined by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, choose it. Hence the same irregularity and confusion would be introduced by a compliance with this proposition, that I have already noticed as resulting from the regulation proposed by the Pennsylvania minority. In one State a cause would receive its determination from a jury, if the parties, or either of them, requested it; but in another State, a cause exactly similar to the other, must be decided without the intervention of a jury, because the State judicatories varied as to common-law jurisdiction.

It is obvious, therefore, that the Massachusetts proposition, upon this subject, cannot operate as a general

regulation, until some uniform plan, with respect to the limits of common-law and equitable jurisdictions, shall be adopted by the different States. To devise a plan of that kind, is a task arduous in itself, and which it would require much time and reflection to mature. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any general regulation that would be acceptable to all the States in the Union, or that would perfectly quadrate with the several State institutions.

It may be asked, Why could not a reference have been made to the Constitution of this State, taking that, which is allowed by me to be a good one, as a standard for the United States? I answer, that it is not very probable the other States should entertain the same opinion of our institutions which we do ourselves. It is natural to suppose that they are hitherto more attached to their own, and that each would struggle for the preference. If the plan of taking one State as a model for the whole had been thought of in the Convention, it is to be presumed that the adoption of it in that body, would have been rendered difficult by the predilection of each representation in favor of its own Government; and it must be uncertain, which of the States would have been taken as the model. It has been shown that many of them would be improper ones. And I leave it to conjecture, whether, under all circumstances, it is most likely that New York, or some other State, would have been preferred. But admit that a judicious selection could have been effected in the Convention, still there would have been great danger of jealousy and disgust in the other States, at the partiality which had been shown to the institutions of one. The enemies of the plan would have been furnished with a fine pretext for raising a host of local prejudices against it, which perhaps might have hazarded, in no inconsiderable degree, its final establishment.

To avoid the embarrassments of a definition of the cases which the trial by jury ought to embrace, it is sometimes suggested by men of enthusiastic tempers, that a provision might have been inserted for establishing it in all cases whatsoever. For this, I believe no precedent is to be found in any member of the Union; and the considerations which have been stated in discussing the proposition of the minority of Pennsylvania, must satisfy every sober mind, that the establishment of the trial by jury in *all* cases, would have been an unpardonable error in the plan.

In short, the more it is considered, the more arduous will appear the task of fashioning a provision in such a form as not to express too little to answer the purpose, or too much to be advisable; or which might not have opened other sources of opposition to the great and essential object of introducing a firm National Government.

I cannot but persuade myself on the other hand, that the different lights in which the subject has been placed in the course of these observations, will go far towards removing in candid minds the apprehensions they may have entertained on the point. They have tended to show, that the security of liberty is materially concerned only in the trial by jury in criminal cases, which is provided for in the most ample manner in the plan of the Convention; that even in far the greatest proportion of civil cases, and those in which the great body of the community is interested, that mode of trial will remain in its full force, as established in the State Constitutions, untouched and unaffected by the plan of the Convention; that it is in no case abolished * by that plan; and that there are great, if not insurmountable difficulties, in the

* *Vide* No. LXXXI., in which the supposition of its being abolished by the appellate jurisdiction in matters of fact being vested in the Supreme Court, is examined and refuted.—*Publius*.

way of making any precise and proper provision for it, in a Constitution for the United States.

The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious for a constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in civil cases, and will be the most ready to admit, that the changes which are continually happening in the affairs of society, may render a different mode of determining questions of property preferable in many cases in which that mode of trial now prevails. For my part I acknowledge myself to be convinced, that even in this State it might be advantageously extended to some cases to which it does not at present apply, and might as advantageously be abridged in others. It is conceded by all reasonable men, that it ought not to obtain in all cases. The examples of innovations which contract its ancient limits as well in these States as in Great Britain, afford a strong presumption that its former extent has been found inconvenient; and give room to suppose that future experience may discover the propriety and utility of other exceptions. I suspect it to be impossible in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point at which the operation of the institution ought to stop; and this is with me a strong argument for leaving the matter to the discretion of the Legislature.

This is now clearly understood to be the case in Great Britain, and it is equally so in the State of Connecticut; and yet it may be safely affirmed, that more numerous encroachments have been made upon the trial by jury in this State since the Revolution, though provided for by a positive Article of our Constitution, than has happened in the same time either in Connecticut or Great Britain. It may be added, that these encroachments have generally originated with the men who endeavor to persuade the People they are the warmest defenders of popular liberty, but who have rarely suffered constitutional obstacles to arrest them in a favorite career.

The truth is, that the general GENIUS of a Government is all that can be substantially relied upon for permanent effects. Particular provisions, though not altogether useless, have far less virtue and efficacy than are commonly ascribed to them; and the want of them will never be, with men of sound discernment, a decisive objection to any plan which exhibits the leading characters of a good Government.

It certainly sounds not a little harsh and extraordinary to affirm that there is no security for liberty in a Constitution which expressly establishes the trial by jury in criminal cases, because it does not do it in civil also; while it is a notorious fact that Connecticut, which has been always regarded as the most popular State in the Union, can boast of no constitutional provision for either.

PUBLIUS.

[From M'LEAN'S *Edition*, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]

[THE FÆDERALIST.] NO. LXXXIV.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]

IN the course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head, or were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so far consult brevity, as to comprise all my observations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.

The most considerable of the remaining objections is,

that the plan of the Convention contains no Bill of Rights. Among other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked, that the Constitutions of several of the States are in a similar predicament. I add, that New York is of the number. And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited admiration for its Constitution, are among the most intemperate partisans of a Bill of Rights. To justify their zeal in this matter, they allege two things: one is, that though the Constitution of New York has no Bill of Rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in favor of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance, amount to the same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not expressed in it, are equally secured.

To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the Convention contains, as well as the Constitution of this State, a number of such provisions.

Independent of those which relate to the structure of the Government, we find the following:— Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7, “Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.” Section 9, of the same Article, Clause 2, “The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” Clause 3, “No bill of attainder or *ex post facto* law shall be passed.” Clause 7, “No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall,

“without the consent of the Congress, accept of any
 “present, emolument, office, or title of any kind what-
 “ever, from any king, prince, or foreign State.” Article
 3, Section 2, Clause 3, “The trial of all crimes, except
 “in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such
 “trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes
 “shall have been committed; but when not committed
 “within any State, the trial shall be at such place or
 “places as the Congress may by law have directed.”
 Section 3, of the same Article, “Treason against the
 “United States shall consist only in levying war against
 “them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid
 “and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason,
 “unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
 “overt act, or on confession in open Court.” And
 Clause 3, of the same Section, “The Congress shall
 “have power to declare the punishment of treason; but
 “no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood,
 “or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at-
 “tainted.”

It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon the whole, of equal importance with any which are to be found in the Constitution of this State. The establishment of the writ of *habeas corpus*, the prohibition of *ex post facto* laws, and of TITLES OF NOBILITY, to which we have no corresponding provisions in our Constitution, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any it contains. The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. The observations of the judicious BLACKSTONE,* in reference to the latter, are well worthy of recital:

* *Vide* BLACKSTONE'S *Commentaries*, vol. 1, page 136. — *Publius*.

"To bereave a man of life," (says he,) "or by violence to confiscate his estate without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore *a more dangerous engine* of arbitrary Government." And as a remedy for this fatal evil, he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the *habeas corpus* Act, which in one place he calls "the BULWARK of the British Constitution." *

Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of Republican Government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the Government will be any other than that of the People.

To the second, that is, to the pretended establishment of the common and statute law by the Constitution, I answer, that they are expressly made subject "to such alterations and provisions as the Legislature shall from time to time make concerning the same." They are therefore at any moment liable to repeal by the ordinary Legislative power, and of course have no constitutional sanction. The only use of the declaration was to recognize the ancient law, and to remove doubts which might have been occasioned by the Revolution. This consequently can be considered as no part of a declaration of rights; which under our Constitutions must be intended as limitations of the power of the Government itself.

It has been several times truly remarked, that Bills of Rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of

* Vide BLACKSTONE'S *Commentaries*, vol. 4, page 438. — *Publius*.

privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the Barons, sword in hand, from King JOHN. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the *Petition of Right* assented to by CHARLES I., in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an Act of Parliament called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to Constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the People, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the People surrender nothing; and as they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations. "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the "blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do "ordain and establish this Constitution for the United "States of America." Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State Bills of Rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics, than in a Constitution of Government.

But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the Nation, than to a Constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the Convention, on this score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the Constitution of this State. But the truth is, that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.

I go further, and affirm, that Bills of Rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority, which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the National Government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for Bills of Rights.

On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much has been said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two: in the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable concerning it in the Constitution of this State; in the next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in that of any other State, amounts to nothing. What signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved?" What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security,

whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any Constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the People and of the Government.* And here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.

There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the point. The truth is, after all the declamation we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. The several Bills of Rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and conversely the Constitution of each State is its Bill of Rights. And the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the Bill of Rights of the Union. Is it one object of a Bill of Rights to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the Government? This is done in the most ample and precise manner in the plan of the Convention; comprehending various precautions for the public security, which are not to be found in any of the State Constitutions. Is another object of a Bill of Rights to define certain immunities and

* To show that there is a power in the Constitution, by which the liberty of the press may be affected, recourse has been had to the power of taxation. It is said, that duties may be laid upon publications so high as to amount to a prohibition. I know not by what logic it could be maintained, that the declarations in the State Constitutions, in favor of the freedom of the press, would be a constitutional impediment to the imposition of duties upon publications by the State Legislatures. It cannot certainly be pretended that any degree of duties, however low, would be an abridgment of the liberty of the press. We know that newspapers are taxed in Great Britain, and yet it is notorious that the press nowhere enjoys greater liberty than in that country. And

if duties of any kind may be laid without a violation of that liberty, it is evident that the extent must depend on Legislative discretion, regulated by public opinion; so that, after all, general declarations respecting the liberty of the press, will give it no greater security than it will have without them. The same invasions of it may be effected under the State Constitutions which contain those declarations through the means of taxation, as under the proposed Constitution, which has nothing of the kind. It would be quite as significant to declare, that Government ought to be free, that taxes ought not to be excessive, &c., as that the liberty of the press ought not to be restrained.—*Publius.*

modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private concerns ? This we have seen has also been attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan. Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a Bill of Rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the Convention. It may be said that it does not go far enough, though it will not be easy to make this appear ; but it can with no propriety be contended, that there is no such thing. It certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the Government. And hence it must be apparent, that much of what has been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and nominal distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance of the thing.

Another objection, which has been made, and which, from the frequency of its repetition, it is to be presumed is relied on, is of this nature : It is improper " (say the objectors) " to confer such large powers, as are proposed, upon the National Government ; because the seat of that Government must of necessity be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the constituent, of the conduct of the representative body." This argument, if it proves anything, proves that there ought to be no General Government whatever. For the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands, ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted to a body which is not under every requisite control. But there are satisfactory reasons to show, that the objection is, in reality, not well founded. There is in most of the arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of the imagination. What are the sources of information, by which the people in Montgomery county must regulate their judgment of the conduct of their Representatives in the State Legislature ? Of personal observation they

can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on the spot. They must therefore depend on the information of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how must these men obtain their information? Evidently from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints, from correspondences with their Representatives, and with other persons who reside at the place of their deliberation. This does not apply to Montgomery county only, but to all the counties at any considerable distance from the seat of Government.

It is equally evident, that the same sources of information would be open to the People, in relation to the conduct of their Representatives in the General Government; and the impediments to a prompt communication which distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced by the effects of the vigilance of the State Governments. The Executive and Legislative bodies of each State will be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the National administration; and as it will be in their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can never be at a loss to know the behavior of those who represent their constituents in the National Councils, and can readily communicate the same knowledge to the People. Their disposition to apprise the community of whatever may prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied upon, if it were only from the rivalry of power. And we may conclude with the fullest assurance, that the People, through that channel, will be better informed of the conduct of their National Representatives, than they can be, by any means they now possess, of that of their State Representatives.

It ought also to be remembered, that the citizens who inhabit the country at and near the seat of Government will, in all questions that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest with those who are at

a distance ; and that they will stand ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union.

Among the many curious objections which have appeared against the proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least colorable is derived from the want of some provision respecting the debts due to the United States. This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters. The newspapers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this head ; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition to the remarks I have made upon the subject in another place, I shall only observe, that as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that, "*States neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil Government.*" *

The last objection of any consequence, which I at present recollect, turns upon the article of expense. If it were even true, that the adoption of the proposed Government would occasion a considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no weight against the plan. The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced, that Union is the basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be preserved under the present system, nor without radical alterations ; that new and extensive powers ought to

* *Vide* RUTHERFORD'S *Institutes*, 11, chap. ix. sect. viii. and ix.—vol. 2, book 11, chap. x. sect. xiv. *Publius*. and xv. *Vide* also GROTIUS, book

be granted to the National head, and that these require a different organization of the Fœderal Government; a single body being an unsafe depository of such ample authorities. In conceding all this, the question of expense must be given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the system is to stand. The two branches of the Legislature are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons, which is the same number of which congress, under the existing Confederation, may be composed. It is true, that this number is intended to be increased; but this is to keep pace with the progress of the population and resources of the country. It is evident that a less number would, even in the first instance, have been unsafe; and that a continuance of the present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a very inadequate representation of the People.

Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new Government. Let us examine this a little.

It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the present Government, are the same which will be required under the new. There are now a Secretary of War, a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury consisting of three persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks, &c. These offices are indispensable under any system, and will suffice under the new as well as the old. As to Ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other difference, than to render their characters, where they reside, more respectable, and their services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will form a very considerable addition to the number of Fœderal offi-

cers; but it will not follow, that this will occasion an increase of public expense. It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of State for National officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance, the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. The States individually will stand in no need of any for this purpose. What difference can it make in point of expense, to pay officers of the customs appointed by the State or by the United States? There is no good reason to suppose, that either the number or the salaries of the latter, will be greater than those of the former.

Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense, which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented to us? The chief item which occurs to me, respects the support of the Judges of the United States. I do not add the President, because there is now a President of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if anything, short of those which will be incurred on account of the President of the United States. The support of the Judges will clearly be an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum which will be an object of material consequence.

Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that may attend the establishment of the proposed Government. The first thing which presents itself is, that a great part of the business which now keeps Congress sitting through the year, will be transacted by the President. Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident, that a portion of the year will suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives: we may

suppose about a fourth for the latter, and a third, or perhaps half, for the former. The extra business of treaties and appointments may give this extra occupation to the Senate. From this circumstance we may infer, that until the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number, there will be a considerable saving of expense from the difference between the constant session of the present, and the temporary session of the future Congress.

But there is another circumstance, of great importance in the view of economy. The business of the United States has hitherto occupied the State Legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made requisitions which the former have had to provide for. Hence it has happened, that the sessions of the State Legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the mere local business of the States. More than half their time has been frequently employed in matters which related to the United States. Now the members who compose the legislatures of the several States amount to two thousand and upwards; which number has hitherto performed what under the new system will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth or a fifth of that number. The Congress under the proposed Government will do all the business of the United States themselves, without the intervention of the State Legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit in any proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference, in the time of the sessions of the State Legislatures, will be clear gain, and will alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system.

The result from these observations is, that the sources

of additional expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution, are much fewer than may have been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a Government less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.

PUBLIUS.

[From McLEAN's *Edition*, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]

[THE FŒDERALIST.] No. LXXXV.

[TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]

ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion, two points, — “the analogy of the proposed Government to your own State Constitution,” and “the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican Government, to liberty, and to property.” But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do anything more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said; which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.

It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the Convention to the Act which organizes the Government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects, are the reeligibility of the Executive; the want of a Council; the

omission of a formal Bill of Rights ; the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press : these and several others, which have been noted in the course of our inquiries, are as much chargeable on the existing Constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union ; and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections, which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the Convention among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the Government under which they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own Constitution is equally, or perhaps more vulnerable.

The additional securities to republican Government, to liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who might acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the People ; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate ; in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation ; in the express guaranty of a republican form of Government to each ; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility ; and in the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State Governments, which have undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.

Thus have I, Fellow-Citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the People, which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in various ways practised to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend: it is certain, that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse, that it has been neither often, nor much.

Let us now pause, and ask ourselves, whether, in the course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act

agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'Tis one that he is called upon, nay, constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect, that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence of the Nation; and let him remember, that a majority of America has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject.

I shall not dissemble, that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption; and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded, that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the Revolution has produced.

Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? "Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is "irrevocably established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission, that the plan is radically defective; and that without material alterations, the rights and the interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion

of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as promises every species of security which a reasonable People can desire.

I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our National affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies, must necessarily be a compound as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States, in a common bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such materials?

The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this city,* are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new Convention, under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late Convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered; and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this aspect.

* Entitled "*An Address to the People of the State of New York.*" — *Publius*.

It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here then the chances are as thirteen to nine* in favor of subsequent amendments, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.

This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final Act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.

But every Amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be

* It may rather be said TEN, for the measure, three fourths must though two thirds may set on foot ratify. — *Publius*.

brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other point; no giving, nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of effecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged, that the persons delegated to the administration of the National Government, will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction, that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the Government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion, constantly *impose* on the National rulers the *necessity* of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this, that the National rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth Article of the plan, the Congress will be *obliged*, "on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States," (which at present amount to nine,) "to call a Convention for proposing

“Amendments, which *shall be valid* to all intents and “purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by “the Legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by “Conventions in three fourths thereof.” The words of this Article are peremptory. The Congress “*shall call* “a Convention.” Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change, vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds, or three fourths of the State Legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the People. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State Legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the National authority.

If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is, that I am myself deceived by it; for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.

The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man, who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer, equally solid and ingenious: “To balance a large State or society,” (says he,) “whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a “work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, “however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of “reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of “many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must “guide their labor; TIME must bring it to perfection;

“and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they *inevitably* fall into, in their first trials and experiments.”* These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION, without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole People, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States; and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I KNOW that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general National Government in every possible shape.

PUBLIUS.

* HUME'S *Essays*, vol. 1, page 128. — *The Rise of Arts and Sciences*. — *Publius*.

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